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ABSTRACT
Strategically determining organizational boundaries is one means to achieving better
performance. This dissertation examines vertical integration, strategic acquisitions and concurrent
sourcing to better understand the strategies used to acquire human capital and the impacts of these
choices on performance outcomes. Using transaction cost economics and the organizational capabilities
literatures I develop hypotheses to determine and explain the relevant antecedents to these strategic
decisions. I then determine how the decision to make or buy (or both) human capital impacts
competitive advantage and how competitive advantage impacts financial outcomes (i.e., revenue, and
sales). Hypotheses are tested using data on 30 organizations from Major League Baseball (as well as
their subsidiaries) spanning from 2002-2011. Regression models are used to identify significant
predictors of the sourcing decision and how the sourcing decision impacts performance through
competitive advantage.
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CHAPTER 1: THE DISSERTATION TOPIC
Introduction
Identifying the boundaries of organizations is a storied topic in strategic management (e.g.,
Chandler, 1977; Coase, 1937; Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975). The boundary of an organization is
very important as organizations choose what businesses to be in and the extent of their involvement.
While this has been an ongoing question, scholars struggle to explain how organizations make these
determinations (Parmigiani, 2007). To provide some insights into these decisions, I seek to answer the
following questions: What factors affect organizations’ decisions to source their human capital (i.e.,
Study 1)? How do these decisions impact competitive advantage and does competitive advantage
mediate the relationship between sourcing decisions and financial outcomes (i.e., Study 2)?
In regards to the first of these two questions, organizations must make strategic decisions about
where to draw boundaries and how much of the value chain to control. Broadly, there are two sides to
this coin, (1) to determine these decisions in synergetic ways in order to add value and (2) to determine
these decisions to reduce costs. Regarding the former, scholars argue that organizations should
concentrate on core competencies and contract with the market (i.e., buy) for inputs which they do not
have a competitive advantage in producing (e.g., Barney, 1991) or that cannot lead to advanced and
sustainable capabilities, an important construct to determining organizational boundaries (Madhok,
1996). If an organization can add value by producing internally it should do so, but if not, it should buy
the input in the market. Others point out that contracts are expensive, and that other organizations act
opportunistically and in unexpected, uncertain ways (e.g., Williamson, 1981). Thus, when organizations
(1) need very specific assets (i.e., non-redeployable investments), (2) in uncertain environments, and (3)
at high frequencies, they should make the input to alleviate holdups and transaction costs present in the
market.
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Of course these different approaches have some interplay (see Geyskens et al, 2006). While it
can be strategic to primarily make or to buy, a single approach may lead to the too-much-of-a-goodthing (TMGT) effect; complete vertical integration depends too heavily on organizational capabilities,
while completely acquiring has control problems and high information and coordination costs which put
organizations at risk for opportunistic behaviors. Because vertical integration limits options, and
strategic acquisitions at high levels diminish the ability to recognize opportunism, too much of either
may eventually lead to diminishing returns (or even negative impacts). Therefore, organizations may
choose to both make and buy, a practice termed concurrent sourcing (e.g., Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani
& Mitchell, 2009), also referred to as tapered integration (e.g., Harrigan, 1986; Rothaermel, Hitt, &
Jobe, 2006) and plural governance (e.g., Hennert, 1993; Puranam, Gulati, & Bhattacharya, 2013). The
idea that there is an optimal sourcing decision and that the decision can vary across organizations is also
captured in literature examining the alignment of organizational actions with characteristics of, and
conditions affecting, an organization. As is presumed by the TMGT effect, misalignment is thought to
negatively affect organizational performance.
Major League Baseball (MLB) is a unique context for the sourcing decision. All 30 MLB teams
have programs in which they develop their players’ skill sets (i.e., minor leagues). If a player performs
well within the developmental system, he may be promoted through various developmental stages and
eventually make it on an organization’s professional roster. A professional roster of an MLB team
consists of 25 players, some of whom may come from an organization’s internal developmental system.
Players who are not a product of the team’s development system are acquired in the marketplace, either
through free agency or via trades. The interesting question is what determines how many players on a
professional roster come from a team’s developmental program and how many are developed by other
teams and later traded to, or purchased by, the acquiring organization. In strategic management we
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continue to study how, why, and when organizations use internal or external labor (Bidwell & Keller,
2013), issues this context helps us understand. The sourcing decision is a common issue for MLB teams
as it is for other business organizations. Just as business organizations have accountants, sales
representatives and so forth, MLB teams have positions requiring various specialized skills, such as
pitchers, infielders, catchers, et cetera. All MLB teams must consider the extent to which they will
develop players internally (some who will become talented members of the organization, and some who
will not), or seek talent from other teams. Regarding the former, moving players with potential to the
professional roster is similar to promoting talented employees up the corporate ladder in a business
organization. Likewise, when MLB teams have needs for talented players, but do not have the internal
talent to fill those needs, they may acquire players from other teams. Talent acquisitions can come from
close industry competitors (i.e., intradivision rivals in a MLB setting) or from any organization that
equips players with the desired skill sets, including international leagues. Furthermore, organizations
that acquire talent in the marketplace also potentially diminish the performance of competitors through
human capital loss (Shaw, Park, & Kim, 2013).
In the case of MLB, and in accordance with the resource based view (RBV) of the firm, teams
have varying resources. Some teams may have more capital (i.e., wealth in the form of money or assets);
some may have better developmental programs; and some may have both or neither asset. Accordingly,
these resources are capabilities which impact organizational competitive advantage. Regarding the three
fundamental mechanisms of transaction cost economics (TCE) (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and
frequency), asset specificity is low (i.e., the skills employees possess readily transfer to other
organizations), uncertainty varies among players (i.e., it’s unknown whether employees will continue to
perform but even less known is an organization’s ability to develop employees), and frequency varies
(i.e., some teams have higher turnover than others). Using MLB, I explore and test antecedents of the
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acquisition of human capital as well as the subsequent impact of this strategic decision on various
performance outcomes.
MLB allows me to explore performance outcomes in various ways. Throughout the past two
decades a greater emphasis has been given to multiple performance measures such as the triple bottom
line, the balanced scorecard, competitive advantage, stakeholder performance, varying financials
outcomes, and so forth (e.g., Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Brower & Mahajan, 2012;
Clarkson, 1995). Within MLB, I analyze three performance outcomes. Specifically, I determine how
sourcing impacts competitive advantage (i.e., one type of performance outcome) and then also how
competitive advantage impacts revenue and sales (i.e., two other performance outcomes). This not only
helps nail down whether sourcing impacts competitive advantage but also sheds light on the ensuing
impact on separate financial outcomes. In doing so, I measure competitive advantage through team wins
to assess whether the sourcing of human capital impacts this performance outcome. Subsequently, I
determine whether competitive advantage impacts financial performance outcomes of MLB team
revenue (i.e., the incoming dollar amount), and sales through ballpark attendance. These are appropriate
performance measures for MLB and also align my two stage performance analysis with the theoretical
framework. By providing multiple and varying outcomes rather than one measure for financial
performance, I can deduce generalizable conclusions relevant to MLB that also apply to other business
organizations.
Contribution of the Dissertation
Vertical integration is a well-developed topic that continues to receive attention in the literature
(e.g., Zhang, 2013). More recent topics such as concurrent sourcing are embedded within vertical
integration and also maintain relevance in top strategy journals (e.g., Heide, Kumar, & Wathne, 2013;
Krzeminska, Hoetker, & Mellewigt, 2013; Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009; Puranam et
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al, 2013). I will utilize literature on vertical integration and concurrent sourcing to unpack vertical
integration, strategic acquisitions, and concurrent sourcing and explain how these prominent topics in
strategic management relate and apply to human capital. I will identify the impacts of various levels of
concurrent sourcing rather than treating this as a dichotomous phenomenon. This differentiation will
help to better explain how varying levels of concurrent sourcing impact various outcomes. I also test
concurrent sourcing through human capital which may shed light on differences between human capital
and other more traditionally tested inputs in the value chain (e.g., products, raw materials). The context
which I examine, MLB, allows me to further explore organizations’ sourcing decisions in unique (e.g.,
human capital and competitive advantage) yet generalizable ways.
Next, TCE has been fundamental to vertical integration, but relatively silent about concurrent
sourcing. As a prominent mid-range theory, TCE should be useful in explaining concurrent sourcing. I
will demonstrate the utility of TCE to understanding concurrent sourcing, extending the application of
this theoretical framework. Further, the TCE literature has not given enough attention to frequency (i.e.,
the third leg of the transaction cost “stool”), an aspect necessary to better ground research using TCE.
Therefore further explanations of the frequency leg will incrementally contribute to TCE theory. Finally,
by designing hypotheses between the organizational capabilities and TCE literatures (e.g., Parmigiani,
2007), I address the utility of each as a theoretical perspective to explain varying degrees of concurrent
sourcing human capital.
In addition to identifying antecedents of the make versus buy decision in Study 1, I examine its
impact on performance by analyzing two aspects of the strategy—performance relationship:
organizational alignment and the TMGT effect (i.e., Study 2). I address organizational alignment
between predicted concurrent sourcing and actual concurrent sourcing to provide evidence as to whether
following the predicted strategy (i.e., alignment) makes organizations more successful. Then I test the
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TMGT effect which is fairly well studied in certain areas of strategy (e.g., diversification), however
vertical integration and strategic acquisitions have received less attention in the TMGT effect literature.
I address this deficiency by showing that the make versus buy decision, specifically involving human
capital, is impacted by the TMGT effect. These performance related contributions reveal the importance
of considering multiple performance mechanisms less often explored in lieu of a single financial
outcome. Namely, the results show how strategic concurrent sourcing impacts competitive advantage
and how competitive advantage impacts financial outcomes. Further, although it can be difficult to
precisely measure an organization’s value creating strategy (i.e., competitive advantage, Barney, 1991),
MLB records a statistic for wins and losses which precisely measures a team’s competitive advantage.
Thus, MLB provides an opportunity to demonstrate how the composition of an organization’s human
capital impacts competitive advantage and how competitive advantage mediates the relationship
between sourcing and financial outcomes as shown below in Figure 1.
Study 2

Study 1

Uncertainty

Revenue

Frequency
Developmental
Capabilities

Competitive
Advantage

Number
Acquired

Knowledge of
Buying
Environment

Sales

Resources

Figure 1. Overview of the Dissertation
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Definitions of Key Terms
Below are definitions for the terms that are critical to the dissertation. These include terminology
important to the literature review, theory, and hypotheses sections:
Vertical Integration. Vertical integration “involves a variety of decisions concerning whether
corporations, through their business units, should provide certain goods or services in-house or purchase
them from outsiders instead” (Harrigan, 1985, p. 397).
Strategic Acquisitions. Strategic acquisitions are the governance mechanism that emerges when
organizations rely on markets to provide specialized capabilities as a supplement to organizations’
existing competencies. (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007: 467-468).
Concurrent Sourcing. Concurrent sourcing “occurs when firms both make and buy some of their
requirements for a component” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009, p. 1066) “or simultaneously make and
buy the same good” (Parmigiani, 2007, p. 285).
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). “The transaction cost approach to the study of economic
organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of
transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations” (Williamson, 1981, p. 548).
Organizations attempt to reduce transaction costs according to three fundamental elements: asset
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1985).
Organizational Capabilities. Organizational capabilities “views the firm as a bundle of resources
and capabilities linked together through firm-specific routines which can behave both as a competitive
constraint as well as the source of sustainable value” (Madhok, 1996, p. 578).
Competitive Advantage. Competitive advantage is when an organization creates more value than
rival organizations (Barney & Hesterly, 2012).
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Organizational Alignment. Organizational alignment refers to how closely an organization’s
actions agree with its predicted actions based on its internal characteristics and external influences.
Deviations from predicted courses of action lead to misalignment.
Too-Much-Of-A-Good-Thing Effect. A meta-theoretical principle stating that most relationships
resemble an inverted U such that predictor variables have a beneficial impact at first but cease to be
positive beyond certain levels (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013: 315).
Summary of the Remaining Chapters
In chapter two, prior literature on vertical integration, strategic acquisitions, concurrent sourcing,
performance, organizational alignment, and the TMGT effect are reviewed to develop and explain
antecedents to the sourcing decision (Study 1) and how the sourcing decision affects performance
outcomes (Study 2). After reviewing the literature, I develop the theory and hypotheses in chapter three.
This is followed by a description of the methods (chapter four) and results (chapter five). In chapter six,
I conclude with a discussion of findings, their limitations, and future research.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter begins by addressing buyer-supplier relations. Following this positioning within the
literature, I discuss vertical integration, strategic acquisitions, and concurrent sourcing as separate
decisions while also addressing varying levels of concurrent sourcing. Then performance, organizational
alignment and the TMGT effect literatures are reviewed. Finally, an overview of MLB is provided
describing the developmental system for players on MLB teams and its applicability to sourcing human
capital in strategic management. The objective of chapter two is to review the sourcing literature,
demonstrate the need to better understand factors affecting make versus buy decisions, provide an
overview of performance, why balance may be optimal, and how MLB is useful for these purposes.
Buyer- Supplier Relations
Within the realm of corporate strategy, organizations must determine the foci of their business
and how much of the vertical chain to control. Extending the value chain is an expansion of an
organization’s business and is done for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, risk mitigation,
cost reduction, synergies, managerial decisions, and exploitation of economies of scope (Ansoff, 1957;
Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). Regardless of the reasons, the most widely analyzed determinant of
value chain boundaries is its impact on performance (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). This research
dates back to the early works of Rumelt (1974; 1982) and has been a topic of great interest since the mid
1900’s when U.S. organizations dramatically expanded their boundaries (Rumelt, 1982).
In the case of buyer-supplier relations, organizations may choose to engage with suppliers or
expand existing value chains by developing internally (i.e., backward integration). Research has focused
on various issues in the buyer-supplier domain such as governing relations (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009),
understanding trade-offs (Hoetker, 2005), antecedents and consequences of opportunism (Hawkins,
Wittmann, & Beyerlein, 2008), interorganizational collaboration, quality assurance, and flexible
9

delivery systems (Imrie & Morris, 1992). Other issues also receiving attention include just-in-time
manufacturing, minimum inventory programs, effectiveness of purchasing, and sourcing decisions
(Turnbull, Oliver, & Wilkinson, 1992). Although many aspects of buyer-supplier relations are outside
the scope of this dissertation, I focus on key aspects of this relationship. Namely, do single value chains
source through the buyer-supplier relationship, internal processes, or both?
Hence, the first emphasis (i.e., Study 1) of my work examines the sourcing decision as it pertains
to backward integration. Organizations must determine which aspects of their business they will make
internally and which they will buy on the market through various buyer-supplier relations. Beginning
with an overview of buyer-supplier relations helps demonstrate how the present study is embedded in a
rich literature stream. By reviewing this literature I can see how these sourcing decisions are often made
through economizing on transaction costs and building synergies from organizational capabilities.
Furthermore, concurrent sourcing, as discussed more thoroughly in the coming pages, may allow
organizations to balance all of the above by reducing transaction costs and enhancing synergies that are
associated with a balanced strategy of making and buying. The following subsections highlight three
different organizational choices when acquiring necessary inputs: to vertically integrate, strategically
acquire, or concurrently source.
Vertical Integration: The Decision to “Make”
Vertical integration is an aspect of organizing by which organizations conduct more of the value
chain internally. Research on vertical integration has remained prominent since the 1930s when Coase
(1937) ignited streams of research by asking a simple but powerful question: If markets are efficient,
what purposes do organizations serve? Though prominent in strategic management, this topic is also
important to other disciplines. For example, operations management scholars study the supply chain and
marketing scholars study sales and distribution (Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min, Nix, Smith, &
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Zacharia, 2001). These examples relate to where a value chain should start and where it should end,
respectively.
Vertical integration may occur through backward integration which addresses the supplier side of
a single value chain “where the firm takes over ownership and control of producing its own components
or other inputs” (Grant, 2008, p. 344). Backward integration (also known as upstream) is the focal side
of sourcing decisions at the core of this study. Alternatively, forward integration (also known as
downstream) is control over the post-production process all the way to the customer. Together the line
of activities related to one product or service is termed the value chain. Organizations make decisions
about how much of this chain to control, related to economies of scope and scale along the value chain.
With products, for example, this involves all steps from extracting raw materials to placing a finished
good into a customer’s hands. Organizations which control more of these steps (i.e., between raw
materials and purchases) are considered to be more vertically integrated (Barney & Hesterly, 2012).
Historically this work has focused on production. However, a limited number of studies have begun to
address how and why this is important for human capital and how organizations can develop their
employees to enhance organizational performance (e.g., Saks & Haccoun, 2010). For example, Lepak
and Snell (1999) design a framework based on the uniqueness and value of human capital and determine
employment mode, employment relationship, and HR configurations. They propose organizations’ can
gain competitive advantage by internally developing highly unique, highly valuable employees.
As with most strategic decisions, vertical integration has benefits and costs. Harrigan (1984)
identified two forms of benefits: internal benefits (e.g., integration economies, improved coordination,
and time savings by avoiding interactions with suppliers) and competitive benefits (e.g., improve
intelligence, opportunity to create differentiation, control, and synergies). Other benefits include
removing the threat of opportunism, synergy, reduction of uncertainty, securing supply of raw materials,
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protection and control over assets and services, access to new forms of technology, and simplified
procurement associated with reducing the number of suppliers to an organization (Balakrishnan &
Wernerfelt, 1986; Carter, 1977; Coase, 1937; Harrigan, 1984; Ketchen, Eisner, Dess, & Lumpkin, 2009;
Klein, Crawford, & Alchian; 1978) Despite the advantages to vertically integrating, there are also
disadvantages.
While vertical integration gives the organization procurement simplicities, administrative and
coordination costs must be considered (Zhou, 2011). If coordination costs outweigh the benefits of
vertical integration, expanding the value chain should be avoided. Other internal disadvantages include
excess capacity and poor organization (Harrigan, 1984). Competitively, organizations may get stuck
with obsolete processes (i.e., loss of flexibility), lose information from suppliers or even exaggerate the
suggested synergies (Harrigan, 1984). There are also costs of additional facilities, equipment, and so
forth. Finally, even if vertically integrated organizations are more flexible by coordinating inputs while
avoiding holdup costs (Coase, 1937; Klein, 1988), highly integrated organizations can lack flexibility
and adaptability because of high switching costs (Monteverde & Teece, 1982), and more challenges to
change through learning in stable environments (Sorenson, 2003).
Many of the above advantages and disadvantages have been studied for production but there are
differences for human capital. For example, humans have the potential to behave in very unpredictable
ways such as choosing to resign from a company immediately after receiving training; yet unlike most
machines, humans can provide verbal feedback about the training they receive to expedite the specific
development process, thereby adding value to the organization due to the decision to vertically integrate.
Only when managers are mindful of both the advantages and disadvantages can vertical integration be a
useful corporate strategy in developing human capital.
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Strategic Acquisitions: The Decision to “Buy”
Organizations that are not vertically integrated instead choose to acquire from others (e.g.,
allowing other organizations to train and develop human capital). Strategic outsourcing is “the
organizing arrangement that emerges when firms rely on intermediate markets to provide specialized
capabilities that supplement existing capabilities deployed along a firm’s value chain” (Holcomb & Hitt,
2007, pp. 467-468). However, because outsourcing commonly implies that an organization no longer
conducts a function that was previously completed internally, the semantics as applied to this context are
not quite precise. In the context of human capital, the purchased “product” from the market is not
perishable in the same way a component might be. Rather, the human capital asset remains in the
organization. Thus there is some difficulty in choosing the most appropriate term. However, henceforth I
refer to the process of acquiring human capital from other organizations as strategic acquisitions. Rather
than produce the necessary inputs (e.g., labor, products) themselves, these organizations acquire them
from others. This allows organizations to be more modular, conducting activities they do best, avoiding
unnecessary coordination costs for activities that will not lead to greater synergies, and also giving
organizations access to talent and opportunities to learn. There are, of course, downsides to acquiring,
such as lengthy contracts, losing touch with supplier innovation, and so forth. While allowing others to
develop human capital exploded in popularity during the 1980s, some organizations find advantages to
bringing activities back in house (McLaughlin & Peppard, 2006) due to the discovery of hidden costs
and complexities associated with outsourcing (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010).
Acquiring human capital is relevant to a whole host of organizational functions including human
resources, enterprise resource planning systems, financial, production, inventory, analytics, and
customer service (Laplante, Costello, Singh, Bindiganavile, & Landon, 2004). Acquiring rather than
developing continued to spread during the past two decades primarily due to technological

13

advancements which made it easier to conduct business offsite. Oddly, acquiring has received limited
coverage in strategic management (e.g., Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Rothaermel et
al, 2006).
Like the present study, other prominent research has related this important organization
boundary decision to two fundamental theories, TCE and organizational capabilities (Holcomb & Hitt,
2007). TCE focuses on efficiency and economizing on exchanges through contracts and primary
mechanisms (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency), and organizational capabilities promotes
acquiring human capital if outside of its core competencies (i.e., does not provide synergy or sustainable
competitive advantage). Thus, organizational capabilities allow organizations to focus on core
competencies yet still provide two fundamental guidelines to best achieve strategic acquisitions:
resource-picking (i.e., managers outsmart the resource market) and capability-building (i.e., managers
design systems to elevate the selected resources) (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Makadok, 2001).
As organizations continue to seek voluntary arrangements to exchange in the market
(Rothaermel et al, 2006), acquiring talent will remain a viable option. In this study, which focuses on
human talent, MLB teams face difficult decisions when acquiring human capital because, despite their
best efforts to draft optimal contracts, not all information can be uncovered ex ante. Furthermore,
although most acquisition literature applies to human capital, not all of the costs and benefits apply. For
example, learning from suppliers has limited value in MLB. Additionally, although teams may attempt
to do so, they cannot completely predict future needs. Therefore, in cases where human capital
development may not be ready, acquiring is a reasonable alternative because of its immediate impact in
times of urgent need. However, because vertical integration and strategic acquisitions have costs and
benefits, recent research points to advantages of using both, a practice termed concurrent sourcing.
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Concurrent Sourcing: The Decision to “Make” and “Buy”
Concurrent sourcing is the process by which organizations both make (i.e., vertically integration)
and buy (i.e., strategically acquire) necessary inputs (Parmigiani, 2007). This is also known as tapered
integration, “when firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on outsiders for a portion of their
supplies or distribution” (Harrigan, 1984, p. 643). Organizations do this to stay knowledgeable about
inputs they are purchasing which avoids other organizations acting opportunistically (i.e., taking
advantage of an organizations lack of knowledge), an issue that links capabilities (i.e., knowledge) and
transaction costs (i.e., opportunism). Moreover, because concurrent sourcing allows organizations to
acquire resources from the market, rarely will the buyer be put in undesirable situations due to dire need
(Adleman, 1949). Additionally, organizations can control and supplement their needs flexibly and with
the greatest reduction of performance uncertainty (Mols, 2010), which is especially important
considering the behavioral uncertainty of human capital. Hence in the case of MLB, teams can
supplement their rosters with successfully trained players or strategically acquired players as necessary.
Organizations consider a host of questions when deciding whether to vertically integrate or
strategically acquire, a rigorous calculus weighing costs and benefits. Research often implies
organizations must either make or buy, and neglects the fact that organizations can both make and buy at
the same time. A blend of both allows organizations to integrate knowledge back to their internal
operations (He & Nickerson, 2006; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). Having this internal process provides
organizations with absorptive capacity to acquire knowledge from similarly focused suppliers (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990). In the case of human capital, this gives organizations the know-how to develop talent
and also to assess and refine acquired talent. Scholars focused on the sourcing issue as early as the 1940s
(Adleman, 1949), but more intensely since the 1980s (Harrigan, 1984; 1985). Yet we still see
incremental advancements on this important topic within our major journals (He & Nickerson, 2006;
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Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009; Rothaermel et al, 2006). I contribute to this literature by
demonstrating how concurrent sourcing affects an organization’s competitive advantage via
organizational alignment and the TMGT effect. In addition, I examine the importance of organizational
alignment and the TMGT effect associated with concurrent sourcing’s impact on financial performance
through competitive advantage.
Organizational Performance
Certain advantages of concurrent sourcing are expected to enhance performance because
concurrent sourcing allows firms to balance TCE and organizational capabilities perspectives. Adelman
(1949) points out that organizations will rarely overproduce inventory because they can rely on the
market for additional supplies if needed and hence obtain all possible sales by avoiding inventory stock
outs. This allows organizations to produce their supplies internally at optimal efficiency levels rather
than acquire additional production or service equipment that may sit idle at times. Because concurrent
sourcing permits learning (Adelman, 1949), performance is also enhanced by improving quality and
cutting costs based on new and learned knowledge. Other benefits of concurrent sourcing have been
highlighted in prior sections such as gained information, reduction of vulnerability to shortages (Bradach
& Eccles, 1989), reduction of information asymmetry (Heide, 2003), monitoring of R&D, and enhanced
bargaining power (Harrigan, 1984) but these benefits are often only implicitly connected to
performance. Through the use of MLB data, multiple performance outcomes are tested to determine
whether roster composition has an impact.
Much of the extant research assumes because organizations pursue concurrent sourcing, it
ultimately helps them perform better or survive longer. However, as Parmigiani (2007) notes,
organizational economics theories, in which much of the make, buy, or concurrently sourcing literature
is embedded, assume that organizations always make efficient sourcing decisions. Mols (2010b, p. 525)
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argues “that concurrent sourcing improves performance when firms face a combination of volume
uncertainty, technological uncertainty, performance uncertainty, non-decomposability, transactionspecific investments, and strong internal and external capabilities.” This demonstrates how concurrent
sourcing integrates strengths from transaction cost and organizational capabilities literature but again,
only theoretically rather than empirically.
There have, however, been some empirical tests demonstrating how concurrent sourcing of
innovation and control processes enhance performance (Bradach, 1997), and how trucking firms use
both internal truck-drivers as well as outsourced truck-drivers for efficiency, appropriability, and
competition (He & Nickerson, 2006). Still, much more has been proposed than empirically tested.
Accordingly, because performance is a multidimensional construct (e.g., competitive advantage,
financial outcomes), not all sourcing decisions are perfectly optimal, and our knowledge about the
implications of concurrent sourcing on performance can be enhanced through further empirical tests,
therefore further investigation of the implications of concurrent sourcing on performance is necessary.
Organizational Alignment
To further assess the effects of concurrent sourcing on performance, I also examine the
relationship as a question of proper organizational alignment. Organizational alignment can be
interpreted in a variety of ways. For contingency theorists, it means organizations aligning with
environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). For others it is both the coordination of vertical and
horizontal activities (Kathuria, Joshi, & Porth, 2007). In this study, I refer to alignment as the proximity
of organizations’ observed actions in comparison to the actions predicted based on their internal
characteristics (e.g., developmental capabilities) and external influences (e.g., market size) which are
drawn from TCE and organizational capabilities theories. Minimizing the difference between what they
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actually do and what they are predicted to do leads to better alignment; a determinant which scholars
argue leads to better performance (Sampson, 2004).
The benefits of alignment provide organizations a natural way to tap into their strengths by
following a prescribed strategy based on organization specific characteristics (i.e., get the most out of
what you have). Alignment also allows organizations to reduce transaction costs by choosing to do what
best suits the organization rather than unnecessarily searching and transacting (i.e., internally or
externally) when it does not fit organizational characteristics. Albeit transitory periods may be necessary
to make internal adjustments according to external shocks, organizations are best suited by acting
strategically according to their characteristics.
Misalignment involves making inappropriate decisions that do not correspond with organization
specific characteristics, leading to lower rates of survival (Bigelow, 2003; Silverman Nickerson &
Freeman, 1997) and lower profits (Mayer, 2000). Misalignment occurs for a number of reasons,
including irrational decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), bounded rationality (Simon, 1972),
miscalculations, hubris, and changing conditions (Sampson, 2004). Often misalignment occurs
especially in the short term as both managers and markets work toward equilibrium, reducing
misalignment in the long term (Sampson, 2004; Williamson, 1985).
Costs and consequences of misalignment significantly and negatively impact performance
(Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005). From a TCE perspective this is often due to excessive opportunism
hazards and excessive bureaucracy (Sampson, 2004). Excessive opportunism hazards occur when
organizations need too much from the market (i.e., suppliers in this context), whereas excessive
bureaucracy costs come when organizations are attempting to conduct too much of the business
internally when in fact they are better suited to seek market-based suppliers. On the other hand,
misalignment from an organizational capabilities perspective reduces synergies causing organizations to
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miss out on opportunities to add value and create dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003). Whether hoping
to align or trying to avoid misalignment, organizations discover better performance by acting in
accordance with their characteristics and constraints.
Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing Effect (TMGT effect)
Finally, the impact of varying sourcing arrangements on performance is examined through
curvilinear relationships. A growing body of work in strategic management suggests that predictor
variables, often ones which have a positive impact, can have negative effects if taken too far (Pierce &
Aguinis, 2013). This curvilinear relationship is depicted by the classic inverted U, demonstrating
decreasing returns after a certain inflection point (or at least diminishing). Pierce and Aguinis (2013)
recently published this as a meta-theoretical principle, suggesting that the TMGT effect is prevalent
throughout many fields of management (e.g., strategy, entrepreneurship, and organizational behavior).
They present diversification (i.e., vertical integration is a type of diversification) as an example of the
TMGT effect in strategic management (e.g., Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Qian, Li, Li, & Qian,
2008).
Performance improvements from related diversification drop as organizations expand beyond
their related capabilities (Markides & Williamson, 1996; Palich et al, 2000). This highlights problems
from both the “too much” and the “too different” perspectives. Even more directly, performance
declines with greater diversification (Lang & Stulz, 1994). More recently, scholars presented findings of
curvilinearity in diversification (Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008). This phenomenon extends to vertical
integration, a form of diversification and the focus of this study.
Rothaermel and colleagues (2006) address the degree to which vertical integration and strategic
acquisitions are beneficial. For strategic acquisitions they find product portfolio, new product success
and organization performance all have diminishing returns once reaching an inflection point. They also
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examine tapered integration (i.e., concurrent sourcing), finding positive effects on products for an
organization that makes and buys the same inputs (i.e., balancing vertical integration and strategic
acquisitions). It is unknown whether similar findings will occur for human capital within the value
chain. Additionally, their results for strategic acquisitions are significant but only partially supported for
vertical integration. These two differences provide room for my study to incrementally contribute to
work on the TMGT effect. Professional baseball allows me to address the issues for the acquisition of
human capital and the elusive optimization of concurrent sourcing.
Context: Major League Baseball (MLB)
Professional athletics is a proven and effective context for many organizational phenomena
(Wolfe et al, 2005). The use of sports data to facilitate management research has been recognized at
major conferences (e.g., Academy of Management) as well as in prominent management journals (Katz,
2001; Seifried, Soebbing, Washington, & Bendickson, 2014). Seifried and colleagues (2014) specifically
highlight the underdeveloped potential sports data provide. Sports data are useful due to accuracy,
consistency, and collection over relatively long periods of time, and they provide excellent measures of
success and failure (Schrage, 2013). This is ideal for testing concepts in strategic management. For
example, Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly (2009) used National Football League (NFL) data to examine
managerial ability, resource quality, resource value creation, and organizational performance. More
closely related to human capital, Wright and colleagues studied fit between human resources and
strategy among NCAA basketball teams (Wright, Smart, & McMahan, 1995). Many management topics
have also been explored using MLB data. Some of these include relational mechanism of embeddedness
through trades (Barden & Mitchel, 2007), pay distribution-performance relationships (Bloom, 1999),
pay equity (Howard & Miller, 1993), resource divestment capability (Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007),
managerial succession and organizational performance (Allen, Panian,
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& Lotz, 1979; Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 2002), and competitive advantage (Poppo & Weigelt, 2000).
The following sub-sections describe important details about MLB as it pertains to concurrent sourcing of
human capital.
The Developmental System
To examine how teams finalize their rosters, I focus on the process of acquiring players, and
explain the functions of the developmental system, namely why organizations might choose a strategy
which emphasizes using its developmental system or a strategy of acquiring players from other
professional rosters. Additionally, I describe the use of trades and free agency as means of acquiring
human capital, and important financial aspects of MLB. MLB franchises (i.e., the professional and
developmental teams under one umbrella organization) have several ways to obtain players: the draft,
international draft, trades with other teams, and acquiring players in the external market (i.e., free
agency). Once players are obtained, franchises can cultivate talent through their developmental
programs (also known as minor leagues or farm systems), if players are not ready for the professional
roster.
There are primarily two ways in which a MLB franchise can sign contracts with non-professional
players: The first-year player draft and the international draft. This is how franchises acquire a majority
of the players that they “make.” The first-year player draft takes place in June and involves all 30 MLB
franchises (MLB.com, 2013), each of which selects amateur players. The pool of players eligible for the
draft include unsigned high school players who have decided to forego college, junior college players
(who are eligible to be drafted at any time) or players participating at four-year colleges and universities
who have completed their third year of college (i.e., applies to college players who choose to attend a
four-year institution) (MLB.com, 2013). Once franchises know which players are draft-eligible, they
begin to select players based on the draft order. The draft order is determined according to the results of
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the previous season with priority given to poorer performing teams in order to increase parity throughout
the league as long as they are able to offer competitive contracts and signing bonuses.
A second opportunity for signing undrafted players is during the international signing period.
This process begins July 2nd and allows franchises to offer contracts to international prospects. To be
eligible players must be classified as amateur, meaning they have not signed a professional contract, be a
resident of a country outside of the U.S., Canada, or a U.S. territory (e.g., Puerto Rico), and be at least
17 years of age before September of that year (MLB.com, 2013). Many of the talented players sign
contracts in early July; however this period extends through June 15th of the following year (MLB.com,
2013). As with the domestic draft, selection order is determined to provide poorer performing teams
with earlier choices.
After players sign contracts, most enter a club’s developmental system rather than immediately
join the professional roster. For this reason all drafted players enter franchises under what I label the
“make” categorization. Players join one of the franchise’s developmental teams at the beginning of the
next season. Each team’s developmental system contains six levels of play, and the placement level of a
newly drafted player depends on his ability. From novice to advanced, there are two levels known as
“rookie ball,” two levels of Class A (i.e., Low A and High A), Class AA, and Class AAA. For example,
the Minnesota Twins have the following developmental teams in their system (from lowest to highest
level): Gulf Coast League Twins, Elizabethton Twins, Cedar Rapids Kernels, Fort Meyers Miracle, New
Britain Rock Cats, and the Rochester Red Wings (Baseball Reference, 2013).
Once assigned to a level of play in the developmental system, a player’s progression depends on
his performance and demand in upper leagues (or on the professional roster). There is no definitive time
frame for players to make a professional roster, an aspect of uncertainty that comes with developing
rather than acquiring talent from other professional rosters through trades or free agency. Exceptionally
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talented players often advance through the developmental system in one to two years. Others may
advance much slower or not at all. Since each franchise has six developmental teams, many players
never make it to the professional roster. Finally, in addition to signing amateur players for development,
franchises can also acquire players from other professional rosters through trades, or sign players who
have entered free agency. These more experienced players are generally more costly, but are often able
to make an immediate impact on a team’s professional roster.
Trades
Most trading occurs between two franchises but trades can involve multiple franchises. Trades
often occur between seasons and for a variety of reasons and represent a form of cooperation in MLB.
First, as valuable professional players near the end of their contracts, they may be traded in exchange for
other professional players or for developmental level prospects. This might occur when a team realizes
its inability, or unwillingness, to retain the professional player’s contract and thus tries to get something
in return rather than losing the player to free agency. Although the exchange may only be for
developmental level players, the trade is a means to acquire prospects who might soon contribute to the
professional roster. For example, the Cleveland Indians traded pitcher Cliff Lee, whom they did not
intend to re-sign, to the Philadelphia Phillies just prior to the trade deadline (i.e., July 31) in 2009. This
provided the Phillies with an elite pitcher whom they needed to perform well in the playoffs and in
exchange the Cleveland Indians received four lessor known players whom they sought to develop
(Stark, 2009).
Relatedly, trades might occur because teams are looking to unload high priced players during a
failing season (i.e., lack of wins and/or poor financial performance) in order to save money and begin
rebuilding for the following year. These fire sales, as they are called, generally happen during an
unsuccessful season when teams still have a few talented (and likely pricey) players who are coveted by
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other teams in contention to make the playoffs. For example, in 2012 the Miami Marlins traded Josh
Johnson, Jose Reyes, Mark Buehrle, John Buck, and Emilio Bonifacio to the Toronto Blue Jays for
seven lessor known players, all of whom had relatively low compensation. This deal removed $146.5M
(over the duration of these contracts) from the Miami Marlins payroll (ESPN, 2012) and provided the
Blue Jays with exceptional talent for immediate placement on its professional roster.
Finally, a team may have a very good player in its developmental system that it would like to
promote to the professional roster. If a team already has a higher paid player at that position, it’s logical
to trade that player to make room for newly developed talent. For example, between the 2003 and 2004
season, the Minnesota Twins promoted Joe Mauer, a very talented developmental player to be the
starting catcher, leading to a trade of catcher A.J. Pierzynski to the San Francisco Giants for Joe Nathan,
Francisco Liriano, and Boof Bonser. This exchange benefitted the Minnesota Twins in many ways; the
prospects turned into valuable professional players and Joe Mauer became one of the best catchers in
baseball (Bleacher Report, 2008).
As I explain later, players acquired through trades are categorized as “bought” if they join the
professional roster in less than two full seasons after being acquired by a team but “made” for those who
spend two or more seasons in the acquiring team’s developmental system.
Free Agency
The final of four mechanisms to acquire players is through free agency. MLB regulates the
process of acquiring and keeping players, giving rights to both players and franchises. Upon signing an
amateur player, a franchise controls that player’s rights for six years. Franchises may trade or release
players, but if not, organizations control players until after a player’s sixth year. However, players are
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eligible for salary arbitration after the third year of their initial contract.1 Generally a player’s agent and
the franchise come to an agreement before arbitration takes place, sometimes extending the player’s
contract beyond his eligibility for free agency. However, if agreement is not reached, an arbitrator
determines an appropriate salary for the player (Baseball Prospectus, 2013). Following arbitration, and
assuming the player and franchise have not negotiated another contract, a player becomes a free agent
after his sixth year.
Free agency allows a player to sign a contract with any interested franchise and is the first
opportunity for a player to choose his destination (i.e., assuming multiple teams are interested). A
player’s value in free agency largely depends on the market for his services. Interested franchises must
have a need for the player’s skills and also have the capital available to acquire the player; typically
players earn higher salaries when they sign a free agent contract. For example, while Prince Fielder
averaged ~$6M per year with the Milwaukee Brewers from 2006-2011, the following year he signed a
contract with the Detroit Tigers for $23M per year (Baseball Reference, 2013). Hence, players may
switch franchises to obtain larger contracts if they do not receive a competitive offer from their current
teams before their contracts expire.2
So how exactly do all these forms of human capital sourcing in MLB, the drafting and contract
signing of talent, arbitration, trading and free agency, provide information about the make versus buy
decision? Although players progressing through the developmental system are typically paid less at
1

This explanation is for basic reasons which suffice for the purpose of this project. However, contracts
are much more complicated in how service time is calculated (e.g., differences exist when players are
first brought up to the professional roster and in terms of how many times they are sent back down to the
minor league system).
2
For example, Joe Mauer stayed with the Minnesota Twins although it was rumored his value in free
agency would have fetched a larger contract (Lebowitz, 2011). However, this “home-town” deal rarely
works out if franchises do not resign players before reaching free agency as this may cause some hurt
feelings and resentment on the player side if not offered a competitive contract before free agency
occurs (e.g., Albert Pujols formerly of the St. Louis Cardinals and now a member of the California
Angels).
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earlier stages of their career, the resources devoted to a strong developmental program are costly, and
often include signing bonuses to initially attract players. Thus, while it takes more effort (e.g., more
scouts, better minor leagues coaches), putting emphasis on the developmental program can provide an
organization’s professional roster with a consistent pipeline of quality players. In comparison,
professional players acquired via trade or free agency may not require much development from the
acquiring team but they often demand higher salaries. While initial contracts may seem inequitable to
young players, they still have a lot to prove and, in the meantime, require much coaching, training, and
facilities. Within this system, young players who progress quickly are of tremendous value. Take, for
example, 22 year old Mike Trout of the California Angels, who was one of the best players during the
2012 season yet was compensated just slightly more than the league minimum (Jaffe, 2012) as restricted
players are usually underpaid (Krautmann, von Allmen, & Berri, 2009). Accordingly, all teams desire
some young talent coming up through their developmental system. By examining the number of
acquired players on a team’s professional roster, one can surmise what strategy a team emphasizes.
Payroll Cap, Luxury Tax, and Revenue Sharing
A unique aspect of MLB is the absence of a payroll cap, which is used in all other major U.S.
professional sports leagues (i.e., NFL, NBA, and NHL) to give small-market teams an equal chance of
assembling a successful team, thus promoting competitive balance (Fort & Quirk, 1995). The absence of
a payroll cap allows players to earn up to their market value as free agents (i.e., how top managers are
compensated in business organizations) but highlights the large disparity in purchasing power between
large-market teams (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, and Boston) and small-market teams (e.g.,
Cincinnati, Tampa Bay, Kansas City). Market size is not a determinant of team performance (Schmidt &
Berri, 2002), but there are some positive effects that may come from large-market opportunities (e.g.,
larger television contracts), namely, some of this capital can be used to secure better players.
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However, in addition to allowing poorer performing teams preference in drafting players, MLB
also established a luxury tax and revenue-sharing program as means to narrow payroll disparity. The
luxury tax, formally called the Competitive Balance Tax, dissuades teams from spending excessive
amounts on players’ salaries. A threshold for player payroll is established by league management; for
example, in 2013 it was $178M (Sporting Charts, 2013). Teams may exceed this amount but are taxed
on payroll that exceeds the limit. The tax rate increases for each successive year a team exceeds the
limit. Currently this rate begins at 17.5%, followed by 30% and 40% percent for the next two years and
finally reaching a maximum of 50% for four time offenders. This rate appears to deter most teams. For
example, in 2013 only the New York Yankees (~$229M) and the Los Angeles Dodgers (~$217M)
exceeded the $178M threshold (USA Today, 2013). Notably however, the record setting tax the
Yankees had to pay in 2013 is comparable to the whole Houston Astros payroll (Nightengale, 2013),
leading some to question whether the penalty is severe enough. Over time certain large market teams’
fans (e.g., New York Yankees) have even grown to expect paying luxury taxes (Pesca, 2014). The
luxury tax provides consequences for overspending and is used by the league for pre-designed purposes,
but the tax money is not redistributed to other teams.
Another method aimed to keep the league competitive is the revenue-sharing program, which is
essentially a subsidy for small-market franchises. Unlike some professional sports leagues (e.g., the
NFL) where revenue is earned on a national level, much of MLB revenue is generated and retained on
the local level. The concern is that small-market teams cannot generate the local revenue of large-market
teams and therefore will not have the revenue to acquire adequate talent to be competitive. As a remedy,
MLB created a system in which all teams pay 31% of net local revenue to be combined and equally
distributed to all teams (CBS News, 2008). Large-market teams, such as the Boston Red Sox, are known
as “Revenue Sharing Payor Clubs” (i.e., teams which pay a marginal 31% rate on local revenues) and
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small-market teams, such as the Pittsburgh Pirates, are known as “Revenue Sharing Payee Clubs” (i.e.,
teams that receive a portion of the additional marginal rate) (Brown, 2010; Thurm, 2012). Thus,
regardless of market share, all teams should have resources which allow them to be active in the free
agent market.
Finding a Competitive Strategy
Although MLB established a luxury tax and a revenue-sharing system, team payrolls are far from equal.
In 2013, the top seven highest team payrolls were, on average, $124M more than the seven lowest team
payrolls (USA Today, 2013). To illustrate this point, individual players on large-market teams (e.g.,
Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees has an individual salary of ~$25M) can make salaries equal
to large portions of other teams’ entire payrolls. It would seem this imbalance might provide largemarket teams with a significant performance advantage. However, due to the strength of developmental
programs and the inherent uncertainty of future performance, even for star players, this is not always the
case. With less revenue, small-market teams may choose to adopt a make rather than buy approach as
their formula for success. To accomplish this, small-market teams might trade their soon to be expensive
top talent for high potential minor league players in hopes of building a younger and cheaper yet still
talented team. Bill DeWitt Jr., the Yale (B.A.) and Harvard (M.B.A.) educated Chairman of the St.
Louis Cardinals stated “we set out way back in ’96 to be a consistent contender and we continue to have
that goal. It’s one of the reasons we put so much emphasis on building the farm system and building our
scouting” (Hummel, 2013, para. 8). So if this strategy is implemented successfully, often with a balance
of making and buying, capitalizing on both capabilities and cost reductions, small-market teams can be
as competitive as large-market teams. Six of twenty teams that competed in the World Series from 20022011 were small-market teams (e.g., consider the small-market Tampa Bay Rays of 2008 with a payroll
of only $43M, USA Today, 2013). Hence, the developmental system within MLB provides an
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interesting and appropriate context to examine optimal human capital sourcing strategies to obtain
competitive advantages associated with positive financial outcomes.
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CHAPTER III: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Concurrent sourcing is best viewed through multiple theoretical lenses (e.g., Parmigiani, 2007).
For this study, I use TCE and organizational capabilities to understand and advance knowledge of
concurrent sourcing. A growing body of work has blended the two theories, proposing that balancing
cost reduction and capability advancement may lead to more realistic and complementary conclusions
(e.g., Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Therefore, using the TCE logic and then sorting
through the capabilities rationale, theory and hypotheses are developed to identify factors which impact
the sourcing decision, and examine how that decision affects performance outcomes.
Buyer-Supplier Relations
Reducing Costs through TCE
The sourcing decision has typically been examined through TCE, starting with Coase’s (1937)
work and further developed throughout much of Oliver Williamson’s career (e.g., Williamson, 1975;
1981; 1985; 1999). TCE identifies the transaction as the unit of analysis with a goal to reduce
transaction costs and determine to make or to buy accordingly (Jager & Woke, 2008). TCE posits that
these decisions are fueled by asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency while working under the
necessary assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Asset specificity
has been dubbed the locomotive of TCE (Williamson, 1985); as assets are more specific to an
organization, the organization will more likely need to produce the input (i.e., human capital) internally
(Williamson, 1981). Highly specific assets are difficult to find in the market and organizations that do
not produce these will be vulnerable to a host of potentially negative consequences (e.g., holdup costs).
Asset specificity also often refers to the ability to redeploy assets, generally suggesting more specific
assets are less able to be redeployed.
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Beyond asset specificity, organizations typically strive to avoid multiple types of uncertainty,
which literature reviews have found take on many forms. For example, a review by David and Han
(2004) identified three categories and 24 different forms of uncertainty in the TCE literature. A more
recent study by Crook and colleagues (2013) also identified three primary categories of uncertainty
capturing many different forms. Recognizing its many forms, Geyskens, et al (2006) categorize
uncertainty according to three categories, behavioral, technological, and volume. Behavioral uncertainty
refers to how difficult it is to verify agreement (Poppo & Zanger, 2002), with greater difficulty causing
organizations to prefer hierarchical governance (i.e., make). Technological uncertainty is the degree to
which future technology is unknown (Stump & Heide, 1996), with greater unknowns leading
organizations to prefer market governance (i.e., buy). Volume uncertainty relates to unknown quantities
in the relationship (John & Weitz, 1988), such that as quantities fluctuate and deviate organizations
typically favor hierarchical governance (Geyskens et al, 2006). Hence, sourcing decisions are contingent
on reducing transaction costs from a variety of uncertainty perspectives and although greater asset
specificity often leads to hierarchical governance, greater uncertainty often leads to market governance.
Last, the frequency of transactions will fuel decisions. When needs are infrequent, an
organization should seek the market but when the frequency of transactions is high or regular,
organizations should consider internal production. In short, frequency refers to how often transactions
reoccur. This dimension has received limited attention (Geyskens et al, 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide,
1997), an issue I seek to address and advance theoretically.
Despite the popularity of explaining vertical integration and strategic acquisitions based on the
reduction of transaction costs, TCE has remained somewhat silent on the idea of concurrent sourcing
(e.g., David & Han, 2004; Parmigiani, 2007). Yet more recent reviews (Geyskens et al, 2006) suggest
TCE may provide a powerful lens to view concurrent sourcing in terms of uncertainty and frequency.
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The reduction of transaction costs does not merely suggest the selection of make versus buy, but rather,
the choice to concurrently source may also provide the greatest reduction of transaction costs contingent
on the problem or organizational situation. Thus, TCE may do more than distinguish between make and
buy.
Organizations traditionally consider making for greater control but, when assets are less specific,
organizations are more likely to defer to the market for the most efficient mode of organizing and also
because less specific assets have lower interdependence and embeddedness (Geyskens et al, 2006;
Williamson, 1975; 1985). In relation to TCE, much more is known and tested in regards to asset
specificity. The theoretical work has been novel (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and the empirical tests have
been significant (see David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al, 2006). To enhance the TCE view I have
selected a setting in which asset specificity is low and employees have high skill transferability
(Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012) in order to more readily focus on uncertainty and frequency,
areas that have received less attention but which are critical to concurrent sourcing. Some scholars
suggest uncertainty and frequency have little predictive power without asset specificity and that asset
specificity is a necessary condition for the make decision (David & Han, 2004), but this is not consistent
through all of the literature or in more recent reviews (Geyskens et al, 2006) as some suggest the
presence of other important factors (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). Geyskens and
colleagues (2006) actually find the combined effect of uncertainty had greater impacts on governance
choice. Accordingly, my work helps answer two important questions regarding TCE: (1) Under what
circumstances do organizations still make even though low asset specificity directs organizations
towards market acquisitions? (2) Should organizations give increased attention to uncertainty and
frequency?
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As mentioned, reviews of uncertainty often define it as behavioral, technological, or related to
volume (e.g., Crook et al, 2013; Geyskens et al, 2006); however uncertainty also takes on a multitude of
types (see Macher & Richman, 2008) such as performance ambiguity, prior experience, risk and even
other categorical forms such as market based, for example in demand or price changes (see David &
Han, 2004). When considering human capital sourcing, this conceptualization of uncertainty may be
insufficient. Volume uncertainty does not apply as there are consistently 25 members on each major
league roster. Behavioral uncertainty is “the degree of difficulty in verifying whether compliance with
established agreements has occurred” (Geyskens et al, 2006, p. 525), also not a clear fit for this problem.
Many of these uncertainty studies pertain to other problems rather than human capital such as retail and
manufacturing (Yu, Yan, & Cheng, 2001), biotech alliances (Santoro & McGill, 2005), and metals
(Hennart, 1988). This leads to the conclusion that when applying TCE to human capital sourcing, other
less examined forms of uncertainty must be considered. Rather than redefine or relax the definition, I
focus on talent uncertainty. While talent uncertainty has been addressed in non-TCE contexts (e.g.,
Kräkel, & Schöttner, 2010), the closest operationalization might be related to prior experience (i.e.,
experience of organizations in production and experience of organizations with alliances) as used in
previous research (David & Han, 2004). Talent uncertainty could also be considered a form of
technological uncertainty, if you define technology as consisting of the human skills and professions that
are required to perform work (Barbash, 1984). Henceforth, I address talent uncertainty, which is a more
applicable route for scholars studying uncertainty of human capital through the TCE perspective.
While organizations bear higher levels of talent uncertainty when emphasizing the development
of human capital because these employees are evolving, they may also enter the market to purchase
already developed and less uncertain human capital necessary for their value chain. Hence, at the onset,
there is far more talent uncertainty with developed human capital because an individual’s potential
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remains relatively unknown. Internally developed human capital comes with previously specified
benefits and may turn out to be valuable but talent often develops gradually or plateaus at various stages
in the developmental process and therefore designing an organization too heavily vertically integrated
yields greater talent uncertainty. For example, a line manager may be an excellent decision maker when
it comes to technical choices but once promoted to middle or upper management may lack the
conceptual skills necessary to make decisions about an organization’s vision. Similarly, minor league
baseball players may have great hitting or pitching success at lower levels of the developmental system
but talent uncertainty remains as to whether these skills will transfer to higher levels.
Alternatively, acquiring “proven” human capital from other organizations reduces talent
uncertainty, even if it costs more. These employees have shown an ability to perform at the highest
level, so talent uncertainty is less of an issue. The correlation is not perfect, but prior performance is
generally a good predictor of future performance, especially when prior performance was achieved at an
equivalent level of difficulty. While there is some uncertainty in the market (i.e., it is unknown whether
the appropriate players will be available), appropriate planning and bargaining makes this a more secure
option. Also, although outside acquisitions are sometimes associated with high risk due to poorer
performance when leaving one organization for another (Groysberg, Nanda, & Nohria, 2004), when
talent uncertainty is high, acquiring bought talent reduces this type of uncertainty and provides faster
speed to market, making this choice particularly valuable in the short run. Therefore, in cases where
asset specificity is low, and talent uncertainty varies by organization due to differences in human capital,
the desire to reduce talent uncertainty will lead organizations to concurrently source, but to prefer
strategic acquisitions as uncertainty increases.
H1a When talent uncertainty is high, organizations will prefer strategic acquisitions to vertical
integration.
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After addressing uncertainty, I now examine the third leg of the TCE stool (i.e., frequency) to
help explain the logic for organizational sourcing of human capital. Organizations must deal with
frequencies of input turnover, whether it is the frequency of machine breakdowns or frequency of human
capital changes. Variability and transactions costs both address how and why organizations take certain
actions concerning frequencies of input changes. I begin by addressing TCE logic and then rule out
variability. I posit therefore, that when asset specificity is low (as in this case), TCE provides superior
logic regarding frequencies of human capital turnover in comparison to variation arguments.
TCE research suggests that when frequencies of input turnover or transactions are low,
organizations have greater incentives to buy (Williamson, 1985) because producing internally for
infrequent transactions requires high administrative costs and therefore produces a low payoff. In the
case of product inputs, frequencies fluctuate due to customer demands yet the internal process demands
are quite predictable (e.g., an assembly line). However, in the case of human capital, frequencies
fluctuate based on customer demands and also due to less predictable employee turnover. Yet the
context of MLB falls between more predictable assembly lines and less predictable employee turnover
because contracts restrict players from moving to other teams, a similar yet exaggerated version of noncompete clauses required by certain organizations (e.g., staffing companies and law firms). Although
there is some unpredictability with player injury, MLB franchises confront fewer unforeseen
circumstances impacting organizational personnel (e.g., person-organization fit) than do business
organizations and thus MLB allows generalizations about non-human capital inputs as well. High
turnover is associated with higher transaction costs but, when frequencies are low, buying this input
from the market is more logical because building capabilities for inputs that are infrequently transacted
is a large commitment with low payoff. Accordingly, due to the nature of human capital, organizations
most likely address the frequency problem by making decisions intended to reduce transaction costs.
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Next, attending to frequency concerns in the supply chain is often relegated to production, rather
than human capital. With products, systems exist such as six sigma to reduce production variation
concerning frequency of replacements, thus allowing for lower variation for internalizing product inputs
relative to human capital inputs. However, even when developing internal capabilities to address the
frequency problem, in the case of human assets, capabilities do not reach completion or maximization
after a specific series of events or duration of time. In short, due to variability in human development,
the capabilities logic is less useful in accounting for turnover frequency than it might be when
addressing production frequency. Additionally, the variability of inputs is less a function of problematic
assessment in this context. Therefore, organizations must utilize external as well as internal resources to
address speed to market concerns when dealing with human capital and cannot solely focus on internal
capabilities. Hence, although variation may seem like attractive explanation for frequency, the rationale
behind this argument is less convincing when examining human assets. Accordingly, TCE plays the
greatest role in directing concurrent sourcing due to turnover frequencies, a logic which suggests the
following hypothesis.
H1b When turnover frequencies are high, organizations will prefer vertical integration to
strategic acquisitions.
Creating Synergy through Organizational Capabilities
TCE is a prominent and often fundamental mid-range theory explaining sourcing, but other
theories are also useful. Even with much work in these areas, TCE has not been utilized to explain
concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007). The following presents the rationale for the capabilities view
which has been applied to sourcing (Argyres, 1996; Parmigiani, 2007). By organizational capabilities, I
consider the literature from both the RBV and Grant’s (1996) work on the knowledge based view
(KBV). These perspectives (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984) are particularly helpful for
explaining aspects of sourcing related to resources (including knowledge), capabilities, core
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competencies, relatedness (Markides & Williamson, 1996), and the potential for synergy (Barney, 1991;
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Here, vertical integration and strategic acquisitions of human capital
can work together to synergistically enhance resources within the organization. Such potential is derived
from the VRINS framework which determines the overall strength of a resource based on its Value,
Rareness, Imitability, and Non-substitutability (Wernerfelt, 1989). These types of resources have greater
potential to lead to capabilities and a stronger likelihood of providing competitive advantages to an
organization.
Because concurrent sourcing includes suppliers and internal processes to obtain human capital,
capabilities are not bound to the focal organization. Organizations may develop some inputs, and they
may rely on the capabilities of others; this view blends concurrent sourcing with the relational view, a
more recent extension of organizational capabilities and RBV (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). From
this perspective, organizations use capabilities, including organization specific routines and bundled
resources (Madhok, 1996) to identify the most value-added means of obtaining the greatest talent, a
view that differs from the economizing strategies of TCE.
Organizations that see potential for collaboration between internal processes and strategic
acquisitions can optimize these opportunities by utilizing internal talent where applicable but seeking
talent acquisitions when necessary. While some organizations have superior processes at the core of
their operation, others may have these capabilities throughout the value chain. It is important for
organizations to recognize these capabilities and strategically act on them. Organizations with lessor
capabilities should seek acquisitions in greater numbers because internal processes are not enhancing
their core competencies. Alternatively, organizations that have superior capabilities, while they may
concurrently source, should do so with fewer strategic acquisitions and more vertical integration.
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Therefore this view suggests that regardless of transactions costs, organizations with strong capabilities
will seek to use them which gives rise to the following hypothesis.
H2a Better internal capabilities will lead to more vertical integration rather than strategic
acquisitions.
Parmigiani argues that “the greater the expertise of the firm and its suppliers, the more likely the
firm will concurrently source” (2007, p. 292). However, it is also likely that experience and knowledge
will lead to continuance. That is, organizations that concurrently source still have a tendency (i.e.,
routine) to either make or buy a majority of their inputs. Their prior strategic actions will provide a
strong indication of the future. Organizations become static, reliable and inert which is often referred to
as punctuated equilibrium (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Without some major event, this experience,
routine, and knowledge will lead an organization down the same path in terms of sourcing.
TCE may support this rationale by suggesting economization on current processes to reduce
transactions, but TCE might also suggest abruptly switching due to transaction cost based changes over
time. However, simply abiding by transaction costs does not account for activities for which some
organizations are superior to others. Conversely, the organizational capabilities view suggests
organizations continue to enhance their knowledge and experience in one realm over the other (i.e.,
vertical integration or strategic acquisitions). Mayer and colleagues also theorize that prior acquisition
decisions influence human capital because experience produces systematic differences in capabilities
(Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012). Furthermore, experience also develops absorptive capacity (i.e.,
the ability to acquire this knowledge). Therefore, absorptive capacity, experience, routines, and
knowledge which are all fundamental to the organizational capabilities view suggest that organizations
involved in concurrent sourcing will become more proficient in how they have conducted this business,
and hence continue in this direction. Thus, organizational capabilities suggest powerful logic in regards
to human capital sourcing trends and predict that:
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H2b Organizations with greater experience in vertical integration or strategic acquisitions will
continue to favor this strategy as they concurrently source.
Resources are often broken into four categories: social capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998), human
capital (Lepak & Snell, 1999), technology or knowledge (Grant, 1996), and financial capital.3 In this
study and in the realm of acquiring human capital more generally, organizational resources primarily
come in the form of human capital, or financial capital necessary to acquire human capital.
Consequently, organizations in larger markets have advantages in accessing capital through larger fan
bases, lucrative television contracts, et cetera. Hence, acquiring human capital and providing
competitive advantages as talent is accessed quickly through acquisitions rather than through
internalization is prominent in larger markets due to their financial advantages over small market teams.
Although capital (i.e., wealth in the form of money or assets) contingent on market size is
valuable and somewhat inimitable, few would argue it is rare. Accordingly, market size alone does not
meet all of the conditions for a resource to provide sustainable competitive advantages. However,
positioning in larger markets is often tied to a variety of capabilities. Furthermore, this access to
resources provides enhancements to performance which allow organizations to attract better employees,
provide cutting edge facilities, and focus on opportunities (e.g., gain market share through various
enhancements). Even if there is an inflection point after which capital provides diminishing returns,
organizations can achieve better performance if they are above a minimum threshold. When purchasing
an input in the market, an organization must pay a premium if the input possesses valuable and proven
capabilities ready for immediate use. Organizations have the option of making inputs internally but the
process is costly and takes effort and time. However, capital in this context also includes human capital
and human capital fulfills the VRINS framework and thereby positions an organization for sustainable
competitive advantage. Consequently, organizations with more capital due to their positioning in larger
3

Tangible assets are also resources but are less relevant in baseball except for stadiums, offices, etc.
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markets have advantages in developing certain capabilities but also more options to strategically acquire
other valuable yet often costly inputs. Ultimately, because demand is not always predictable and urgency
is often required, organizations with more available capital will acquire talent from the market in greater
numbers.
H2c Organizations with more capital will strategically acquire in greater numbers.
Organizational Performance
Performance is arguably the most important construct in strategic management research
(Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). Over the years, management scholars have investigated the
determinants and contingencies of organizational performance to explain performance heterogeneity
among structurally similar organizations (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005). This research assumes
organizational strategy impacts organizational performance (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986) and views
human capital as fundamental to organizational performance (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Farjoun, 2002;
Gambardella, Panico, & Valentini, 2013; Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Wright & McMahan,
1992). In this extensive literature, performance has been measured many ways (e.g., accounting
measures, finance measures, operational measures, power, legitimacy, corporate social responsibility,
and so forth), but in this context I look to better understand the impact of sourcing on competitive
advantage and how competitive advantage leads to financial performance outcomes.
Competitive advantage has been measured in a variety of ways. Poppo and Weigelt (2000, p.
586) measured it as “the accumulated skill set of free agents” (e.g., a combination of runs created, allstar votes and so forth). Researchers have also used survey questions about low cost, differentiation, and
switching costs (Kearns & Lederer, 2003; Parsons, 1983; Porter, 1980), a reduction of defects in
semiconductor manufacturing (Hatch & Dyer, 2004), and total quality management scales to
operationalize competitive advantage (Coff, 1999; Douglas & Judge, 2001). There have been varying
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measures but competitive advantage is often poorly defined and operationalized (Ma, 2000). As in this
dissertation, others also suggest competitive advantage comes from organizational competencies yet is
part of an organization’s strategy and hence leads to other performance outcomes as well (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978; Ma, 2000).
Because it is assumed that organizations can pursue different levels of concurrent sourcing to
achieve competitive advantage, one cannot predict a priori that higher levels of strategic acquisition or
vertical integration will, on average, positively impact performance. As explained earlier, MLB
franchises may decide to improve the stock of their human capital by emphasizing the development
system or through a judicious use of free agency and trades. Accordingly, merely examining the effects
of number of acquired players on competitive advantage may yield non-significant results. However,
one can predict that an organization’s concurrent sourcing strategy must be properly aligned with an
organization’s characteristics to positively affect competitive advantage and, similarly, excessive
reliance on either strategic sourcing or vertical integration may negatively affect performance.
Organizational Alignment
There are however some alternative explanations to these talent sourcing decisions.
Organizations make decisions based on their characteristics, and strategies for one organization may not
apply to another. For example, consider two basic organizational strategies, cost leadership versus
differentiation (Porter, 1980). It may not be logical for organizations with different foci to carry the
same balance of low cost versus differentiated products or services. Rather, organizations should align
their product or service offerings with antecedents that drive their focus to ensure better performance
(Sender, 1997). Sampson (2004) examines misalignment. She finds the costs of excessive contracting
hazards and excessive bureaucracy are reduced by transaction costs based alignments. Furthermore,
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sourcing decisions may limit an organization’s capabilities, restricting the potential competitive
advantage if actions lack alignment with prescriptions.
Some have studied alignment through the transaction cost lens (e.g., Johansson, 2008; Sampson,
2004). Others focused on the consequences of misalignment (Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005).
Interestingly, while scholars contemplate whether TCE and organizational capabilities better predict
alignment (Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005), both theories favor the fundamentals of alignment
strategies. Translated to this case, human capital should be either developed or acquired based on
predictions of TCE and organizational capabilities logic. TCE proposes cost reduction through better
alignment. For example, TCE predicts that organizations with high turnover frequencies and also high
vertical integration will have greater competitive advantage than organizations that would be considered
by TCE to be mismatched or misaligned (i.e., low turnover frequencies and high vertical integration or
high turnover frequencies and low vertical integration). On the other hand, organizational capabilities
predicts organizations may augment their competitive advantage by matching actions with prescribed
capabilities. For example, if organizations having an abundance of acquisition experience acquire many
players, they will be tapping into this capability and are thus able to increase their competitive
advantage. However, if they have great acquisition experience yet choose not to acquire personnel, they
will be mismatched or misaligned and accordingly face poorer outcomes.
Despite the differences between TCE and organizational capabilities, both frameworks suggest
alignment is valuable. So while I attempt to differentiate between TCE and organizational capabilities to
predict concurrent sourcing, the theoretical underpinnings of the two actually merge in the case of
alignment. In short, both frameworks suggest that following the strategy predicted based on
organizations’ specific characteristics and environmental conditions should create competitive
advantages for organizations.

42

Accordingly, I propose that these ideas readily transfer to strategic human capital as each
organization has different strengths and weaknesses in talent development and acquisition processes.
Thus, by using the alignment logic which accounts for these differences, organizations will gain
competitive advantages if concurrently sourced to resemble their strengths. For example, organizations
that are better at training should develop/make in greater numbers than organizations that rank poorly at
training. Hence, I hypothesize that sourcing may not be a one-size-fits-all scenario, but rather
competitive advantage is contingent on organizations’ aligning their actual sourcing with the optimal
predictions developed through antecedent variables.
H3a: Organizations with more closely aligned predicted and actual concurrent sourcing will
experience greater competitive advantage.
The TMGT Effect
A second alternative to examine performance is through the TMGT effect. The TMGT effect is
relatively well established for diversification (e.g., Qian et al, 2008) but not fully addressed for vertical
integration or strategic acquisitions. Rothaermel and colleagues (2006) demonstrate that strategic
acquisitions enhance new product size, success, and performance, but this occurs only to a certain extent
and then the effects become negative. However, their study was less conclusive for vertical integration.
Accordingly, I intend to address two important deficiencies in the concurrent sourcing literature. First, I
examine inputs in terms of human capital rather than products and, second, I revisit the idea that vertical
integration (and not just strategic acquisitions) has a curvilinear impact on competitive advantage, a
relationship that seems all too theoretically explainable but was not found to be statistically significant
in prior studies (Rothaermel et al, 2006). As opposed to production or manufacturing, vertically
integrating human capital is advantageous only to a point due to the lack of lean manufacturing process
applicable to products and processes. Hence, acknowledging the TMGT effect for both vertical
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integration and strategic acquisitions leads to strategic decisions to concurrently source, an idea that has
been explored in manufacturing but not with human capital.
Products, services, and human capital have a place in the vertical integration literature. Yet due
to their differences, it is unclear that the rationale used for one is generalizable to others. Vertical
integration has deeper roots on the product side as shown in studies on the auto industry (Monteverde &
Teece, 1982), manufacturing (Anderson, 1985), petroleum production (Armour & Teece, 1980), and so
forth, which describe factors affecting whether organizations do or do not vertically integrate. So, how
might the integration of human capital differ from production or service? I suggest these varying inputs
be looked at separately before making generalizations. Further, prior studies using products found only
strategic acquisitions had a clear TMGT effect (Rothaermel et al, 2006); perhaps when examining
human capital, the TMGT effect will be apparent for vertical integration, if exceeding a certain level of
vertical integration forces organizations to rely too heavily on their own capabilities and networks to
develop human talent. Alternatively, excessive levels of strategic acquisitions require organizations to
evaluate too much talent, incur heavy search costs, and deal with less internal knowledge which makes
organizations more susceptible to opportunism. In short, organizations heavily weighted in vertical
integration or strategic acquisitions will risk diminishing competitive advantage. In contrast,
organizations that are concurrently sourced will enhance competitive advantage by avoiding the pitfalls
of overly internalized or overly acquired organizations. MLB offers an extraordinarily clear metric for
addressing competitive advantage (i.e., team wins). If organizations can optimally balance sourcing,
competitive advantage will be enhanced.
H3b Strategic acquisitions will positively impact revenue but with diminishing returns such that
the relationship will resemble an inverted U-shape.
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Competitive Advantage
The theoretical relationship between competitive advantage and financial performance has been
addressed in strategic management (e.g., Barney, 1991; Porter, 1985), but the construct of competitive
advantage is less clear empirically (Ma, 2000). Competitive advantage comes in many forms, including
shedding costs and creating synergies. Among the sources of competitive advantage are knowledge
(Grant, 1996), social capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998), total quality management (Douglas & Judge, 2001;
Powell, 1995), and human resource systems (Lado & Wilson, 1994), to name a few. Scholars often use
competitive advantage to discuss their views of strategy suggesting “this” or “that” will lead to
competitive advantages and, thus better performance. In this case, properly balanced sourcing is thought
to lead to positive financial outcomes such as revenue or sales4 through competitive advantage. Despite
certain examples discounting the value of competitive advantage, such as the rent appropriation problem
(Coff, 1999) and low constraint general human capital (Campbell et al, 2012), most research assumes or
confirms logic suggesting competitive advantage moderates or mediates financial performance (Ray,
Barney, & Muhanna, 2004). I account for distinct differences in competitive advantages between
organizations, positing that organizations must have strategies (e.g., concurrent sourcing) to gain
competitive advantage before they can enhance financial performance. These ideas lead to the final
hypotheses.
H4a Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and revenue,
yielding a positive indirect relationship.
H4b Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and sales,
yielding a positive indirect relationship.
Table 1 (below) presents a summary of the hypotheses. This table includes all of the hypotheses
from Study 1 and Study 2.
4

Revenue is total amount of money each team receives while sales is operationalized as number of
tickets sold (i.e., fan attendance).
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Table 1. Summary of Study Hypotheses
H1a When talent uncertainty is high, organizations will prefer strategic acquisitions to
vertical integration.
H1b When turnover frequencies are high, organizations will prefer vertical integration to
strategic acquisitions.
H2a Better internal capabilities will lead to more vertical integration rather than strategic
acquisitions.
H2b Organizations with greater experience in vertical integration or strategic acquisitions
will continue to favor this strategy as they concurrently source.
H2c Organizations with more capital will strategically acquire in greater numbers.
H3a Organizations with more closely aligned predicted and actual concurrent sourcing will
experience greater competitive advantage.
H3b Strategic acquisitions will positively impact revenue but with diminishing returns such
that the relationship will resemble an inverted U-shape.
H4a Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and
revenue, yielding a positive indirect relationship.
H4b Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and
sales, yielding a positive indirect relationship.

46

CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN
The sample selection, procedures for data collection, and methods of analysis are described in
this chapter.
Sample and Variables
Archival data were collected for 30 Major League Baseball organizations spanning 10 years
from 2002-2011. Data used in the analyses were collected from various sources, such as Baseball
Almanac, Forbes, and USA Today, among others (see Table 2 for a complete list of sources matched
with variables). A ten year sample provides an adequate snapshot of league roster composition. By
ending in 2011 the data avoid complications created by rule changes in 2012 which impacted the
amateur draft process (Baseball America, 2012). Although there were some other changes during these
years,5 the duration represents a relatively stable time period to analyze the questions being asked. Each
professional organization has 25 members on its roster. For each of these professionals, I identified
whether they came through the organization’s minor league system (i.e., make) or whether they were
acquired from another organization directly becoming a member of the professional roster (i.e., buy). As
a caveat, if talent was acquired and placed in the developmental program for at least two full seasons,
these individuals were considered to come up through the developmental system. Making this
determination for each player/team/year was a lengthy process (i.e., nearly 10,000 determinations). To
consistently select these 25 players for each team and year, I first identified the starting lineup, starting
pitchers, primary relief pitchers, and closing pitcher according to categories on the Baseball Reference
website based on players’ end of the season categorization. After selecting these players, any remaining
spots on a team’s 25-man roster were filled by choosing non-pitchers in order of most games played for

5

In 2008 MLB added limited instant replay (Baseball Almanac, 2013).
47

Table 2. Variables and Sources
Independent Variables Definition
Professional Experience The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional
roster who have greater than six years of experience.

Source
Baseball
Reference

Annual Player Turnover The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional
roster who were not on the team’s roster the prior season.
Developmental Ranking An annual ranking of each team’s developmental program
(1-30), listing the best developmental program as 1 and the
worst as 30.
Acquisition Experience The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional
roster who were acquired (moving average for three prior
years).
Small-Market Size A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that are in the 15
smallest markets. Large-Market Size Teams are the
excluded group.
Buy as Predicted A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that acquire the
number of players predicted. Teams that acquire
more/fewer players than predicted are the excluded group.

Baseball
Reference
Baseball
America

Dependent Variables
Number Acquired The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional
roster who were acquired.
Team Wins The number of wins the team has during the 162 game
regular season.
Made Playoffs A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that made the
playoffs, 0 for all other teams.
Revenue Annual team revenue (in millions of dollars).
Average Attendance The team’s average attendance for home games.
Control Variables
Number of All-Stars The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional
roster who were selected to play in the All-Star game.
Team Salary Annual aggregate compensation paid to all players on the
team’s 25-man professional roster (in millions of dollars).
Ownership Change A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team
has a new owner, 0 for all other years.
General Manager A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team
Change has a new general manager, 0 for all other years.
New Stadium A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team
plays in a new stadium, 0 for all other years.
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Baseball
Reference
Bleacher
Report
Baseball
Reference

Baseball
Reference
ESPN
Baseball
Reference
Forbes
ESPN
MLB.com
USA Today
Bleacher
Report
Baseball
Reference
Ball Parks of
Baseball

the team that season. Finally, the players for each team and year were totaled in order to analyze the data
at the team level.
Independent Variables
Table 2 is ordered in relation to the prior hypotheses for ease of readership. I briefly explain the
rationale for each TCE based variable as it aligns with the hypotheses. Players with greater than 6 years
of professional experience have demonstrated their abilities. For example, experienced outfielders are
more likely to initiate movement in the correct direction when fielding fly balls (Oudejans, Michaels, &
Bakker, 1997). Accordingly, Professional Experience seems an appropriate proxy for talent uncertainty
in assessing these players’ future performance such that low talent uncertainty is equivalent to a high
count of players with experience and high talent uncertainty is equivalent to a low count of players with
experience. Six years is also a natural cutoff point because teams have the rights to players’ contracts for
this duration. Player turnover is also an important consideration in baseball research (e.g., Glenn,
McGarrity, & Weller, 2001). Annual Player Turnover is used to demonstrate how many members of the
team’s 25 man professional roster are replaced annually, a measure of the frequency of player
transactions for each organization.
The next set of independent variables relates to the organization capabilities hypotheses.
Developmental Capabilities are measured by rankings of organizations’ developmental programs, a
historically well-studied labor market also known as the minor leagues and farm system (Rottenberg,
1956). These rankings are an assessment of the stock of talent in an organization’s developmental
system which is an indirect assessment of an organization’s ability to scout and develop talent. Next,
prior numbers of acquired players as a predictor of future numbers are measured through Acquisition
Experience such that the experience and routines of past acquisition numbers will predict future
acquisition numbers. A three-year lagged moving average is used for the Acquisition Experience
variable (e.g., for 2007, it is the average of 2004-2006 number acquired). Finally, in terms of
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organizational capabilities and the resource variable, Small-Market Size is reported as a dichotomous
variable indicating which teams compete in large or small markets. Market size demonstrates resource
richness and the financial ability to more freely acquire talented players in the marketplace; it is often
comprised of items such as metropolitan statistical area population or media revenue (see Schmidt &
Berri, 2002 for a more complete listing). The market size measure for this study was selected from
Bleacher Report, a reputable source for sports statistics in business research (e.g., Harrington, 2014). For
robustness, this list was also compared to the competitive balance lottery which gives priority to the 10
smallest market and 10 lowest revenue teams provided by MLB.com. The separate lists were in
agreement in approximately 93% of cases and when competitive balance was used as a replacement for
Small-Market Size, significant/non-significant results did not change.
Buy as Predicted is derived from the Number Acquired variable to test the alignment hypothesis.
This alignment based variable represents the residuals from the equation used to predict Number
Acquired (observed Number Acquired minus the predicted Number Acquired). Two groups are created.
The cut-off point is one standard deviation from the mean such that approximately two-thirds of the
teams fell within the Buy as Predicted category and one-third in the misaligned category (further
rationale for categorization is presented in the methodology and results). Buying too much or too little
based on organizational characteristics represents misalignment and thus forms the excluded category.
This is consistent with organizational alignment studies that align governance to improve performance
(e.g., Sampson, 2004).
Dependent Variables
The Number Acquired is an endogenous variable in the model. This number is the outcome of
the five make/buy antecedents yet is secondarily an antecedent to competitive advantage and a direct
effect to the financial outcomes. If players are drafted or acquired through other means and spend two
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full seasons in a club’s developmental system, they are considered “made” players. Otherwise if players
are acquired through trade or through free agency they are considered “bought” or “acquired” players.
There are two remaining dependent variables: Revenue and Average Attendance for which Team Wins
(and Made Playoffs) is a mediating variable. Firstly, Team Wins is a count of the number of games a
team wins in the 162 game regular season. Using Team Wins based on the entire season rather than the
post-season outcome is appropriate since organizational capabilities actually account for a low
percentage of post-season success (Lewis, Lock, & Sexton, 2009). Made Playoffs signifies whether a
team is one of eight teams that advanced to post-season play. Both Team Wins and Made Playoffs are
measures of competitive advantage as both variables measure a team’s success directly compared to the
competition. Revenue and Average Attendance are measures of financial performance. Revenue is a
team’s annual revenue and is made up of items such as sponsorships, real estate, ticket sales, and
concessions (Forbes, 2013; Schwartz, 2013). Average Attendance at home games is a more direct proxy
for ticket sales and is a commonly studied and cited outcome in sports research (e.g., Baade & Tiehen,
1990). An additional consideration when selecting the sample years was the time frame. The time period
used for this study provides relative consistency for attendance, excluding the 1994-1995 strike among
other things (Nesbit & Kerry, 2012).6 An overview of the variables and predicted coefficient directions
in association with the theoretical model are displayed below in Figure 2.
Control Variables
Control variables are used in both analyses. Control variables were chosen selectively and more
conservatively in accordance with research that suggests ambiguous or less meaningful controls
confound interpretations of findings (Carlson & Wu, 2011). I begin by discussing the controls used in
Study 1 to examine the antecedents of the make versus buy decision. Changes in ownership (Ownership
6

Other attendance drivers include events such as the 1998 McGuire-Sosa homerun race, Cal Ripken
Jr.’s consecutive games record, and the onset of fantasy baseball leagues (Nesbit & Kerry, 2012).
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Study 1
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Capabilities
Developmental
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Number
Acquired
Number
Acquired
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Advantage
Team Wins
Made Playoffs

+

+
Knowledge of
Buying
Environment
Acquisition
Experience

Sales
Average
Attendance

+

Resources
Small-Market
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Note The theoretical framework is in black text and the variables are in grey text.
*Residual analysis to determine if firms buy more or less than predicted.

Figure 2. The Theoretical Model Including Variables
Change) and top management (General Manager Change) are included to account for the possible
effects that new top management has on organizational decisions related to the acquisition of players
since research suggests these key management figures impact roster composition based on their
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preferences, decision making, and networks (Hersch & Pelkowski, 2012; Rosentraub, 2000). These
variables account for leadership change for three years after a change occurs because it takes time for
new strategies to develop and for major roster changes to come to fruition.
Next I describe the controls used in the performance analyses (i.e., Team Wins and Made
Playoffs; Revenue and Average Attendance). Team Salary and Number of All-Stars are separate proxies
for roster quality. Team Salary is an aggregate of all players’ salaries on the 25 player roster for each
season. While multiple studies have shown salary compression enhances performance (Bloom, 1999;
Jane, 2010), I’m interested in understanding whether total salary spending impacts performance
outcomes. Number of All-Stars is the number of players on the team’s 25-man professional roster who
were selected to play in the All-Star game. With approximately 750 players on all professional rosters
(i.e., 30 teams * 25 players), getting selected as one of the ~80 players who make the All Star game
demonstrates top talent and is therefore an appropriate proxy for quality (Foster & Washington, 2009).
Additionally, new stadiums should drive performance outcomes, particularly Revenue and Average
Attendance, as fans are drawn to the new and presumably improved facilities. This novelty effect lasts
up to eight years in baseball but is particularly strong during the first few seasons (Coates & Humphreys,
2005). Lastly, in recognizing the endogeneity of Number Acquired in the theoretical model, the
antecedents from Study 1 are included as controls for the analyses of performance outcomes. However,
because these controls are likely more applicable for the current year, they are not lagged in the
performance equations as they are in Study 1. Of the variables from Study 1, Small-Market Size may be
of particular importance. Although some studies show Small-Market Size does not impact wins, it does
have an impact on revenue (e.g., Gustafson & Hadley, 2007). Additionally, in Study 1, Professional
Experience is viewed positively (i.e., reducing talent uncertainty); however, older players are often
overpaid (Blass, 1992) which could have an opposite impact on Revenue.
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Descriptive Statistics: Major League Baseball, 2002-2011
Before formally testing the hypotheses, I will briefly describe data used in subsequent analyses.
Table 3 shows descriptive data by team for each variable used in Study 1. The teams are sorted in
descending order on mean Number Acquired, which is the central focus of my dissertation. The mean
Number Acquired for teams was 16.5 of 25 players on the professional roster. The highest mean Number
Acquired was nearly 20 players for the Chicago White Sox, whereas an intra-division rival, the
Minnesota Twins, had the lowest at 11.7 players. Interestingly, all but two teams, the California Angels
and the Minnesota Twins, averaged more acquired players (13+) than made players on their 25 man
professional rosters. Also, somewhat surprising for baseball fans, the New York Yankees, arguably the
poster child for free agent spending, had a mean Number Acquired of 15.8, placing them among the 10
lowest of the 30 MLB teams. It may be that the Yankees’ reputation as a buyer in the free agent market
reflects their high profile talent acquisitions rather than the number of such acquisitions.
Comparing the teams mean Number Acquired with data on the antecedent variables used in
Study 1 also yields some interesting patterns. As one would expect, the mean Number Acquired
corresponds closely to the mean Acquisition Experience, but differences between the two measures
suggest teams do change strategies over time. Regarding mean Professional Experience, some
organizations averaged very few players with six or more years of professional experience such as the
Tampa Bay Rays (an average of 4.9 of 25 players), while other organizations prefer more experienced
rosters like the Boston Red Sox (16.1 of 25) and New York Yankees (17.7 of 25). The data show that
only three of the top ten teams in mean Number Acquired have single digit mean Professional
Experience, while seven of the bottom ten teams in mean Number Acquired have single digit mean
Professional Experience, suggesting that having more acquired players results in a more experienced
professional roster. The data also show that teams with the highest mean Number Acquired tend to be
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among the highest in mean Annual Player Turnover and likewise teams low in mean Number Acquired
tend to have low mean Annual Player Turnover. To my surprise, on average, teams turned over nearly
half of their rosters each year (11.6 of 25 players on average).
Regarding mean Developmental Ranking, a couple of teams like the Tampa Bay Rays and
Atlanta Braves stood out as having very good player development systems, with average rankings of 6.2
and 6.6 respectively. At the other end were the Houston Astros with a mean Developmental Ranking of
23.4 and the St. Louis Cardinals with a mean Developmental Ranking of 23.7. Although casual baseball
fans may not be surprised by the Rays, Braves, and Astros, the Cardinals are now often lauded for their
outstanding minor league system. This reflects a change in organizational strategy that occurred nearly
ten years ago. In fact, “from 2005 to 2011, no team in the majors had as many drafted players contribute
at the major-league level as the Cardinals” (Goold, 2013, para. 11).7 In general, the data appear to
suggest that teams with better player development systems (i.e., lower mean = higher rank) also have
averaged fewer acquired players.
As for market size, there is not much difference between the numbers of large market teams at
the top or bottom of the distribution on mean Number Acquired; seven of the top 10 teams in mean
Number Acquired are in large markets and six of the bottom 10 teams are in large markets. In contrast,
only two of 10 teams in the middle of the distribution are in large markets, suggesting that large market
teams may be more likely to choose one strategy when making their make versus buy decisions.
Table 4 provides a comparison of teams across each of the dependent variables used in the
analyses for Study 2. These data also reveal some notable differences. Although a discernable pattern
between mean Number Acquired and mean Team Wins is not immediately apparent in the data,
collectively the 12 teams below the mean Number Acquired accounted for more playoff appearances
7

Through the efforts of Branch Rickey, the St. Louis Cardinals are also credited with inventing the farm
system in the early 1900s (National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum, 2014).
55

(41) than the remaining 18 teams (36). Not surprising, teams with better performance on the field (i.e.,
Team Wins and playoff appearances) tended to be among the top teams in average home attendance. The
top five winningest teams were the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, California Angels, St. Louis
Cardinals, and Philadelphia Phillies, while the poorest performing teams were the Kansas City Royals,
Pittsburgh Pirates, Baltimore Orioles, Washington Nationals, and Tampa Bay Rays. As expected,
number of playoff appearances generally mimics Team Wins although there are some cases where even
the difference in a couple average Team Wins determines quite a difference in number of playoff
appearances (e.g., the Minnesota Twins averaged only two more Team Wins than the Chicago White
Sox yet made the playoffs three times as often). The New York Yankees which were below the mean
Number Acquired for 2002-2011 had the highest number of wins, most playoff appearances, highest
average revenue, and highest average home attendance. Lastly, Average Attendance is impacted by the
number of seats each stadium holds. For example, it is well known that the Boston Red Sox sell out
almost (if not) every game yet their attendance only ranks as number nine as their stadium is older and
holds fewer fans. It is clear that the demand is high, however, since the ticket prices are more expensive
which still makes the Boston Red Sox number two in Revenue.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1

Teams
White Sox
Padres
Red Sox
Mets
Rangers
Dodgers
Marlins
Brewers
ExposNationals
Orioles
Cardinals
Indians
Reds
Athletics
Tigers
Mariners
Rays
Cubs
Giants
Royals
Yankees
Phillies
Pirates
Diamondbacks
Astros
Blue Jays
Braves
Rockies
Angels
Twins
Total Averages

Professional
Experience
(Rank)
12.2 (9)
10.9 (11)
16.1 (2)
14.6 (4)
8.3 (24)
13 (8)
7.6 (27)
10.6 (14)

Annual Player
Turnover
(Rank)
10.8 (23)
13.8 (2)
10.6 (25)
13.1 (4)
13.4 (3)
12.9 (5)
12.5 (8)
12.7 (6)

10 (16)
9 (21)
14.7 (3)
8 (25)
11.2 (10)
7.7 (26)
10.3 (15)
10.9 (11)
4.9 (30)
14.1 (5)
14 (6)
9.2 (20)
17.7 (1)
13.7 (7)
7.3 (29)
9.4 (17)
9.3 (19)
7.4 (28)
10.8 (13)
8.9 (22)
9.4 (17)
8.5 (23)
10.7

13.9 (1)
12 (12)
10.6 (25)
11.4 (20)
11 (22)
11.8 (14)
11.7 (15)
11.6 (17)
12.4 (9)
11.5 (18)
11.7 (15)
12.4 (9)
10.8 (23)
9.4 (28)
12 (12)
12.6 (7)
10.4 (27)
11.3 (21)
12.2 (11)
11.5 (18)
8.3 (29)
8.1 (30)
11.6

Developmental Acquisition
Ranking
Experience
(Rank)
(Rank)
19.1 (24)
16.2 (10)
20.4 (26)
17.6 (3)
15.3 (14)
18.2 (1)
20 (25)
17.8 (2)
12.4 (8)
17.1 (5)
11.2 (6)
17.3 (4)
12 (7)
14.5 (22)
13.2 (11)
16.2 (10)
22.3 (28)
18.4 (22)
23.7 (30)
8.9 (4)
16.9 (18)
17 (19)
21.5 (27)
15.1 (13)
6.2 (1)
12.9 (9)
15.7 (15)
18 (21)
14.2 (12)
16.4 (17)
18.5 (23)
17 (19)
23.4 (29)
16 (16)
6.6 (2)
12.9 (9)
11.1 (5)
8.8 (3)
15.5
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14.8 (20)
17 (6)
16.5 (9)
16.9 (7)
15 (18)
15.2 (15)
15.1 (17)
15.9 (12)
15 (18)
16.7 (8)
15.5 (14)
14.1 (24)
15.8 (13)
13.9 (25)
13.7 (27)
15.2 (15)
14.2 (23)
13.8 (26)
14.7 (21)
13.3 (28)
11.5 (29)
10.7 (30)
15.3

SmallMarket
Size
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1

Mean
Number
Acquired
(Rank)
19.7 (1)
19.5 (2)
19 (3)
18.3 (4)
18.2 (5)
18.1 (6)
17.9 (7)
17.8 (8)

0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0.5

17.8 (8)
17.8 (8)
17.6 (11)
17.2 (12)
17.1 (13)
17 (14)
16.8 (15)
16.6 (16)
16.6 (16)
16.5 (18)
16.3 (19)
15.8 (20)
15.8 (20)
15.5 (22)
15.5 (22)
15 (24)
14.9 (25)
14.9 (25)
14.2 (27)
13.5 (28)
11.7 (29)
11.7 (29)
16.5

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Study 2

Teams
White Sox
Padres
Red Sox
Mets
Rangers
Dodgers
Marlins
Brewers
ExposNationals
Orioles
Cardinals
Indians
Reds
Athletics
Tigers
Mariners
Rays
Cubs
Giants
Royals
Yankees
Phillies
Pirates
Diamondbacks
Astros
Blue Jays
Braves
Rockies
Angels
Twins
Total Averages

Mean Number
Acquired
Mean Wins
(Rank)
(Rank)
19.7 (1)
84.6 (10)
19.5 (2)
77.5 (20)
19 (3)
93.2 (2)
18.3 (4)
79.5 (17)
18.2 (5)
81.8 (12)
18.1 (6)
85.2 (8)
17.9 (7)
80.8 (13)
17.8 (8)
77.3 (21)
17.8 (8)
17.8 (8)
17.6 (11)
17.2 (12)
17.1 (13)
17 (14)
16.8 (15)
16.6 (16)
16.6 (16)
16.5 (18)
16.3 (19)
15.8 (20)
15.8 (20)
15.5 (22)
15.5 (22)
15 (24)
14.9 (25)
14.9 (25)
14.2 (27)
13.5 (28)
11.7 (29)
11.7 (29)
16.5

2
2
6
1
2
4
1
2

Average
Revenue in
Millions (Rank)
174 (13)
157 (21)
238 (2)
213 (3)
170 (14)
209 (5)
135 (29)
152 (23)

Average Home
Attendance
(Rank)
27,852 (20)
29,886 (15)
36,015 (9)
37,223 (8)
29,720 (16)
43,168 (2)
17,599 (30)
30,989 (13)

0
0
6
1
1
3
2
0
3
3
3
0
9
5
0
3
2
0
5
2
6
6
2.7

160 (20)
165 (17)
184 (8)
164 (18)
153 (22)
144 (26)
166 (16)
183 (9)
141 (27)
210 (4)
183 (9)
135 (29)
343 (1)
196 (6)
138 (28)
163 (19)
179 (12)
150 (25)
183 (9)
170 (14)
189 (7)
151 (24)
177

21,475 (27)
27,595 (21)
40,345 (3)
24,381 (23)
25,602 (22)
22,919 (25)
28,906 (19)
32,267 (11)
17,769 (29)
38,405 (6)
38,837 (5)
19,935 (28)
47,949 (1)
37,314 (7)
21,686 (26)
29,386 (17)
32,889 (10)
24,362 (24)
31,081 (12)
30,898 (14)
39,399 (4)
28,985 (18)
30,495

Number of
Playoff
Appearances

72.5 (27)
69.6 (28)
90.1 (4)
78.4 (19)
77 (22)
85.2 (9)
76 (24)
75.8 (25)
75 (26)
80 (15)
84.6 (10)
66.8 (30)
97.5 (1)
89.8 (5)
67.9 (29)
78.7 (18)
79.9 (16)
80.8 (13)
88.9 (6)
77 (22)
90.9 (3)
86.6 (7)
81

Similarly, Table 5 summarizes data for the control variables. Regarding management and
ownership changes, there were many more total changes in general manager (48) than in ownership
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(18). No organization had more than one change in ownership during the 10 year duration. However, a
number of teams had three or four changes in general manager (i.e., Chicago Cubs, Arizona
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

Teams
Angels
Astros
Athletics
Blue Jays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNationals
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
Red Sox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
White Sox
Yankees
Total Averages

Number of
Ownership
Changes
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0

Number of
General Manager
Changes
1
2
0
2
1
1
1
3
3
2

Mean Number
of All-Stars
(Rank)

1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0.6

3
0
1
3
2
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
3
4
0
1
1
2
0
0
1.6
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2.4 (12)
1.9 (21)
1.6 (25)
2.1 (16)
3.3 (3)
2.7 (7)
3.3 (3)
2.2 (14)
2 (20)
2.6 (9)

Mean Team
Salary
(Rank)
101.8 (6)
82.2 (14)
57.5 (24)
68.1 (18)
92.4 (8)
61.5 (22)
90 (11)
105.2 (4)
68.2 (17)
100.2 (7)

New Stadium
from
2002-2011
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

1.2 (30)
2.1 (16)
1.9 (21)
2.1 (16)
2.3 (13)
2.7 (7)
1.3 (29)
1.4 (26)
3 (6)
1.4 (26)
3.2 (5)
2.1 (16)
1.9 (21)
5.1 (1)
1.7 (24)
1.4 (26)
2.6 (9)
2.2 (14)
2.5 (11)
5.1 (1)
2.4

52.1 (27)
89 (12)
59.2 (23)
92.1 (9)
41.1 (29)
116.7 (3)
72.7 (16)
53.4 (25)
102.1 (5)
43 (28)
74 (15)
39.3 (30)
63.8 (21)
130.2 (2)
65 (20)
52.3 (26)
87.9 (13)
67.3 (19)
91 (10)
187.5 (1)
80.2

1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0.3

Diamondbacks, Washington Nationals, Seattle Mariners, New York Mets, Baltimore Orioles, Cincinnati
Reds, and Boston Red Sox). To my surprise, general manager turnover only occurred in approximately
22 percent of ownership changes. Mean Number of All-Stars varies from just over the minimum, which
is 1 per team, up to 5.1 (i.e., for both the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees). All but four teams
fall between 1.4 and 3.3 average players selected for the All-Star game. Eighty million dollars was the
average Team Salary during the 2002-2011. However, the New York Yankees averaged 187.5 million
dollars for player payroll, more than 50 million dollars more than any other organization. Five other
organizations averaged greater than 100 million dollars in annual payrolls, and nine organizations
operated with payrolls under 60 million dollars, demonstrating an obvious disparity in payroll spending.
Finally, eight MLB teams built new stadiums from 2002-2011, but none built more than one.
Finally, descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used in the analyses are provided in
Tables 6 and 7. There were no missing data and all variable means, standard deviations, minimum and
maximum values passed inspection. The variance inflation factor (VIF) scores range from
approximately 6-13, and 10 is often the upper end of the recommended threshold. Exceeding 10 reveals
greater multicollinearity, which can reduce the overall r-squared, confound estimation of the regression
coefficients as well as negatively impact statistical significance test of the coefficients (Hair, Black,
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). However, for equations that exceed VIF scores of 10, these can generally be
ignored for three reasons: high VIF scores in the controls (e.g., Team Salary), high VIF scores due to the
inclusion of powers (i.e., Number Acquired Squared), and when high VIF scores are dummy variables
with three or more categories (i.e., 29 team dummy variables) (Allison, 2012). These considerations
reveal no major problems with multicollinearity.
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1
Mean SD
1
1. Number Acquired
16.48 2.95 1
2. Professional Experience
10.66 3.81 0.19**
3. Annual Player Turnover
12.05 3.59 0.28**
4. Developmental Ranking
15.5
8.67 0.22**
5. Acquisition Experience
16.76 2.7
0.65**
7. Small-Market Size
0.5
0.5
-0.01
8. Ownership Change
0.17
0.38 -0.10^
9. General Manager Change 0.39
0.49 0.12*
N = 300
** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. ^ p < 0.1

2

3

1
-0.10^
0.20**
0.32**
-0.36**
-0.05
-0.08

1
-0.04
0.30**
0.05
0.04
0.13
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4

5

6

7

1
0.08
-0.04
0.02
0.07

1
0.06
-0.05
0.03

1
-0.03
-0.03

1
0.11*

8

1

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2

1. Revenue+
2. Average
Attendance
3. Team Wins
4. Number
Acquired
5. Professional
Experience
6. Annual Player
Turnover
7. Developmental
Ranking
8. Acquisition
Experience
9. Small-Market
Size
10. Number of
All-Stars
11. Team Salary+

Mean

SD

1

170.9

52.9

1

30495

8735

.64**

1

81

11.6

.33**

.51**

1

16.47

2.95

-.10*

-.03

-.06

1

10.66

3.81

.39**

.65**

.42**

.30**

12.05

3.59

-.18

-.30**

-.19**

.27** -.17**

15.5

8.67

.02

.06

-.05

.18**

.20**

.02

1

16.76

2.7

.02

.06

-.12*

.65**

.28**

.19**

.05

1

.5

.5

-.38**

-.44**

-.29**

-.01

-.38**

.16**

-.04

.06

1

2.36

1.6

.43**

.42**

.60**

.07

.34**

-.23**

-.05

.01

-.27**

1

80.23

34.73

.82**

.76**

.42**

-.067

.63**

-.26**

.09

.02

-.53

.45**

1

.24**

.16**

-.02

.00

.15*

-.06

.14*

.07

-.01

.02

.17

13. New Stadium
.08
.27
N = 300
+ in Millions of Dollars (USD)
** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. ^ p < 0.1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1
1

1

Looking first at the variables used in the analyses for Number Acquired (Study 1) Table 6 shows several
significant correlations for the hypothesized relationships. As predicted, Developmental Ranking and
Acquisition Experience are positively and significantly correlated with Number Acquired. But two
correlations are in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Professional Experience and Annual
Player Turnover are both significantly correlated with Number Acquired yet they are both positive rather
than negative as predicted. Perhaps the presence of more experienced players on a team reflects the
organization’s desire to choose experience over youth, thus leading to more player acquisitions through
free agency and trades. And it is possible that organizations must seek the market when experiencing
turnover rather than rely on the developmental system. Small-Market Size was not significantly
correlated with Number Acquired, though the relationship is negative as hypothesized. Significant
correlations are observed between Ownership Change and Number Acquired (negative) and between
General Manager Change and Number Acquired (positive).
Table 7 shows correlations for variables used in the analyses of performance outcomes that
comprise Study 2. Starting with the relationships among the three dependent variables in the analyses
(Team Wins, Average Attendance, and Revenue) we see that Team Wins is positively and significantly
correlated with both Revenue and Average Attendance, suggesting that success on the field improves
organizational performance. When examining the relationships between the antecedent/control variables
and the three dependent variables that are the focus of Study 2, Table 7 shows the relationships to be
very similar across the dependent variables. For example, Professional Experience, Number of All-Stars,
and Team Salary are all positively and significantly correlated with Team Wins, Revenue, and Average
Attendance; and Annual Player Turnover and Small-Market Size are both negatively and significantly
correlated with Team Wins, Revenue, and Average Attendance. There were however a few unique
relationships. Number Acquired is significantly correlated (negative) only with Revenue; Acquisition
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Experience is significantly correlated (negative) only with Team Wins; and New Stadium is significantly
correlated with Revenue and Average Attendance (both positive) but not Team Wins.
Methodology
The methodological design for both studies is as follows. The make versus buy decision is
operationalized as a continuous rather than discrete variable. This contrasts with other research that
treats the make-buy-concurrent sourcing decision as trichotomous (Parmigiani, 2007). Therefore, I test
the make versus buy decision through regression rather than multinomial logistic regression to allow the
endogenous Number Acquired to more freely vary. Analyzing the make versus buy decision in this
manner allows for the possibility that organizations that make 79% could be significantly different than
those that buy 79%, rather than treating these outcomes as equivalent examples of concurrent sourcing,
an idea more recent studies are beginning to consider (e.g., Sako, Chondrakis, & Vaaler, 2013).
To test the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1, I first examine the antecedents of Number
Acquired. Then, for Study 2, I examine how Number Acquired affects Revenue and Average Attendance
through the mediating variable, Team Wins. Regarding the latter, a separate analysis is also conducted to
test the organizational alignment hypothesis (i.e., H3a). Although the theoretical model shows Number
Acquired as a mediating variable between the antecedents of the sourcing decision and competitive
advantage, I am not hypothesizing this as a mediation model for Study 1. Rather I seek to examine
factors affecting the sourcing decision and how that decision subsequently affects performance
outcomes through Team Wins. Due to the obvious endogeneity of Number Acquired for the analyses of
performance outcomes, I include the five antecedent variables (i.e., Professional Experience, Annual
Player Turnover, Developmental Capabilities, Acquisition Experience, and Small-Market Size) when
conducting the mediating analyses for Study 2.
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For Study 1, a regression model is used to determine which antecedents significantly impact
Number Acquired (see Table 8, Study 1). To test Study 2, organizational alignment is tested using the
residuals from the Number Acquired equation, the TMGT effect using Number Acquired and its squared
term in the regression analysis, and mediation models are used to determine the impact of Number
Acquired on Revenue and Average Attendance through Team Wins. Mediation occurs when the effect on
a dependent variable (Y) is explained by an intervening variable (M), rather than directly by the
independent variables (X) (Schurer-Lambert, 2013). To provide results for Study 2, I use a simple
mediation model (Bedeian, 2012; Hayes, 2013) tested with panel data (Cole & Maxwell, 2003).
Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest a 3-step procedure to test mediation, regressing the dependent
variable on the predictor, regressing the mediator variable on the predictor, and regressing the dependent
variable on both the mediator and the predictors (Taylor, 2010). While this technique has drawn some
criticism (see Hayes, 2013: 167-170), a 3-step regression analysis is appropriate for testing the
hypothesized relationships in this study and provides the most straightforward and robust analysis.
Mediation “specifies the existence of a significant intervening mechanism between an antecedent
variable and a consequent variable” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 428). Hence, to test the model for Study 2, I
use a three stage regression analysis to predict how Number Acquired directly impacts Revenue and
Average Attendance, how Number Acquired impacts Team Wins, and finally to predict how Number
Acquired impacts Revenue and Average Attendance through Team Wins (see Table 8, Study 2). If the
direct effect is reduced yet still significant, there is partial mediation, and if the direct effect is no longer
significant, there is full mediation (Hair et al, 2010). Reference to Zhao, Lynch, and Chen’s (2010)
decision tree also clarifies the type of mediation present (i.e., complementary, competitive, indirect,
direct, or none).
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In addition to Figure 1, to test the organizational alignment hypothesis, I use the residuals from
the Number Acquired regression analysis to group teams into two categories: Buy As Predicted and
High/Low Buy; Buy as Predicted teams more closely follow what is expected, that is near zero residuals
of the observed Number Acquired minus predicted Number Acquired; and High/Low Buy teams pursue
more of an acquiring/developing strategy (i.e., identified by positive/negative residuals of the observed
minus predicted). The residuals for each organization provide evidence to determine which teams
acquire more (or fewer) players than expected. This test allows me to determine if alignment, Buy as
Predicted, leads to better performance than misalignment, High/Low Buy. To perform the analysis,
High/Low Buy is the excluded category (see Table 8, alignment hypothesis). Various methods of
creating these groupings were considered and ultimately the most objective choice seemed to be using
one standard deviation from the mean to categorize teams as High/Low Buy, and within one standard
deviation from the mean to represent Buy as Predicted.
As mentioned, to conduct the above analyses I use regression and include the appropriate control
variables as described above. There are three remaining methodological issues to address not previously
mentioned. First, when estimating the equation for Number Acquired, all antecedents are lagged one
year because roster composition is likely determined by factors and decisions that precede the start of
the baseball season. However, although the outcomes of decisions about Number Acquired will not
likely be observed until the following season, the same antecedents are not lagged when used as control
variables for Study 2 since they may have an immediate impact on performance. To maintain a sample
of 300 observations, additional data were collected for the lagged years.
Secondly, there are some issues to consider related to my data. I have collected archival data for
each MLB team for every year from 2002 to 2011. These panel data are strongly balanced, meaning
there is no missing data for each team-year observation. The basic assumptions necessary for ordinary
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least squares (OLS) regression are normality, homoscedasticity, linearity, and an absence of correlated
errors (Hair et al, 2010). Panel data however creates problems for these standard assumptions as the
organizations are not independent of one another from year to year, therefore violating homoscedasticity
and correlated errors assumptions.
There are several estimation techniques available when analyzing panel data, including fixedeffects models and random effects models. Random effects models assume that the specific effects of
the independent variables are uncorrelated. “If you have reason to believe that differences across entities
have some influence on your dependent variable then you should use random effects” (Torres-Reyna,
2014, p. 25). On the other hand, fixed effects models explore the relationship between independent and
dependent variables within an entity and are best used when the impact of variables that vary over time
are not the result of random variation. Because organizations do not vary in completely random ways
from year to year, a fixed effects model is more logical for this dataset. Furthermore, I have all the teams
and all levels rather than a sample of possible levels; this too conceptually supports the fixed effects
model. In addition, statistical tests are also available to help determine whether fixed or random effects
models are more suitable. To best determine which model to use, Stata offers a Hausman test to
determine whether errors are correlated with regressors. The Hausman test treats random effects as the
null hypothesis and fixed effects as the alternative hypothesis. If the probability of chi-squared is
significant (p < 0.05), the fixed effects model is appropriate. “It basically tests whether the unique errors
are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not” (Torres-Reyna, 2014, p. 29). Since
my results for the Hausman test are significant, I estimate the models using fixed effects.
Two common options for estimating fixed effects models to account for problems inherent in the
use of panel data are Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Panel Corrected Standard Errors
(PCSE). I chose to use PCSE because it corrects for serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
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problems in the panel. Accordingly, I estimate pooled organization models using panel corrected
standard errors (PCSE) (Garand, 2010), a function available in STATA’s data analysis software package
(i.e., “xtpcse variables, corr(psar1) hetonly”). Essentially, the estimates of β will be consistent but the
standard errors will be inaccurate. Hence this function “takes into account the contemporaneous
Table 8. Empirical Equations
Study 1: Number Acquired
Regress the DV on the IVs
Number Acquired = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Professional Experience + β12 Annual Turnover + β13
Developmental Ranking + β14 Acquisition Experience + β15 Small-Market Size + ε2
Study 2: Alignment Hypothesis
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Buy as Predicted + ε1
Study 2: TMGT Hypothesis
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired2 + ε2
Study 2: Revenue mediating equations:
Step 1: Regress the DV on the IVs
Revenue = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired2 + ε1
Step 2: Regress the mediator on the IVs
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β21 Number Acquired + β22 Number Acquired2 + ε2
Step 3: Regress the DV on both the IVs and the mediator
Revenue = α + y ∑ Controls + β31 Number Acquired + β32 Team Wins + β33 Number Acquired2 + ε3
Study 2: Average Attendance mediating equations:
Step 1: Regress the DV on the IVs
Average Attendance = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired2 + ε1
Step 2: Regress the mediator on the IVs
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β21 Number Acquired + β22 Number Acquired2 + ε2
Step 3: Regress the DV on both the IV and the mediator
Average Attendance = α + y ∑ Controls + β31 Number Acquired + β32 Team Wins + β33 Number
Acquired2 + ε3
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correlation of the errors (and perforce heteroscedasticity)” (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 638) by using the
residuals to provide a consistent estimate and confirmed through Monte Carlo experiments (Beck &
Katz, 1995), a common practice for running fixed effects models (see Garand, 2010).
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS
Study 1
The results for the TCE and organizational capabilities hypotheses are presented in Model 1 of
Table 9.8 As mentioned, each of the five antecedents is lagged by one year as personnel decisions are
more likely to take form based on experiences and decisions derived from the previous season. For
Hypothesis 1a, greater Professional Experience is expected to lead to fewer players acquired; though the
coefficient for Professional Experience is negative, it is not significant. Accordingly, the results do not
provide support for hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b predicts that higher levels of Annual Player Turnover
will lead to a higher number of developed players; the coefficient for this hypothesis is also not
significant. Hence, neither of the TCE hypotheses are supported.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that organizations with better developmental capabilities should adopt a
strategy emphasizing player acquisition rather than player development. The significant positive
coefficient for Developmental Ranking (0.05, p < 0.01) supports this hypothesis; the lower a team’s
developmental system is ranked, the more acquired players they have on their professional rosters.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that Acquisition Experience positively impacts the number acquired, a prediction
which the coefficient also significantly supported (0.34, p < 0.01). The final organizational capability
hypothesis predicts that greater organizational resources will lead to more acquisitions but this
hypothesis is not supported by the results. So while neither TCE hypotheses are supported, two of the
three organizational capabilities predictions were significantly supported.

8

For complete results see Appendix A.
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Table 9. Results from Study 1 Regression Analysis
Professional Experience
Annual Player Turnover
Developmental Ranking
Acquisition Experience
Small-Market Size
Ownership Change
General Manager Change

B
-0.05
0.03
0.05**
0.34**
-2.13
-0.51
0.50^

Organization fixed effects

Yes

SE
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(1.70)
(0.33)
(0.27)

Observations
300
Notes: Column 1 reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from panel regressions.
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1
Study 2
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict Team Wins. Results of the analysis to examine the alignment hypothesis
(3a) are presented in Model 1 of Table 10.9 As referenced in the methodology, observations were
divided into two groups: Buy as Predicted and the misaligned category (e.g., the excluded category).
The Buy as Predicted group contained a majority of the observations (204) while the misaligned group
included observations greater or less than one standard deviation from the mean (96 observations).
Although I predicted more aligned organizations to perform better, the results of the Buy as Predicted
category were not significant and thus hypothesis 3a was not supported. For robustness, three groups:
Low Buy, High Buy, and Buy as Predicted were also tested to determine if high or low buy had different
impacts on misalignment; however this too did not produce significant findings by excluding the Buy as
Predicted group.

9

For complete results see Appendices B-E
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Table 10. Results from Study 2 Regression Analysis
Team Wins
Team Wins
Alignment
TMGT
H3a
H3b
B(SE)
B(SE)

Revenue+
B(SE)

Revenue+
H4a
B(SE)

Average
Attendance
B(SE)

Number Acquired
-3.27(1.26)**
-3.29(3.93)
-3.43(3.85)
-649.07(577.43)
Number Acquired
Squared
.09(.04)*
.09(.12)
.10(.12)
19.40(17.92)
Professional Experience
1.01(.18)**
1.05(.19)**
-2.68(.56)
-3.08(.57)**
346.50(79.92)**
Annual Player Turnover
-.52(.19)**
-.48(.19)*
-.40(.54)
.44(.53)
-165.76(73.92)*
Developmental Ranking
-.06(.06)
-.04(.06)
-.07(.18)
-.06(.18)
-1.50(24.84)
Acquisition Experience
-.53(.24)*
-.39(.25)
-.62(.75)
-.42(.74)
429.02(117.59)**
Small-Market Size
-11.7(5.79)* -13.67(4.81)** -63.66(39.00) -64.17(41.15) -1712.07(3906.12)
Number of All-Stars
2.90(.32)**
2.97(.32)**
2.60(.99)**
1.35(1.04)
541.03(123.12)**
Total Salary+
-.03(.02)
-.05(.02)
1.10(.09)**
1.10(.09)**
85.12(13.69)**
New Stadium
20.54(7.41)** 21.04(7.21)** 1347.04(1189.50)
Team Wins
.46(.15)**
Buy as Predicted
-.08(.92)
Organization fixed
effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
300
300
300
300
300
Notes: Columns 1–6 report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from panel regressions.
+ in Millions of Dollars (USD)
** p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. ^ p < 0.1
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Average
Attendance
H4b
B(SE)
-652.11(553.31)
19.57(17.21)
241.28(82.75)**
-157.07(71.11)*
-10.78(23.96)
447.87(118.18)**
-1207.27(4484.19)
258.81(129.58)*
90.31(13.49)**
1354.15(1151.71)
109.13(19.97)**

Yes
300

Hypothesis 3b predicted Number Acquired (-3.27, p < 0.01) and Number Acquired Squared
(0.09, p < 0.05) to have a curvilinear impact on competitive advantage (i.e., Team Wins) such that
Number Acquired would have a positive impact on Team Wins but only to a certain extent eventually
diminishing as more players are acquired. While the predictors provide significant results, they differ in
one important respect. Rather than an inverted U relationship, the results show Number Acquired has a
negative impact on Team Wins but, after a team acquired ~16 players further player acquisition begins to
have a positive impact. Accordingly, the results support the notion that the relationship between the two
variables is curvilinear, but as a U rather than inverted U relationship (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The Curvilinear Impact of Number Acquired on Team Wins
Hypotheses 4a and 4b predict that Number Acquired (and Number Acquired Squared) will lead to
higher Revenue (4a) and higher Average Attendance (4b) through the mediating variable, Team Wins.
Team Wins is a significant predictor of both Revenue (0.46, p < 0.01) and Average Attendance (109.13, p
< 0.01). For each additional win, Revenue increases by $460,000. The direct effects of Number Acquired
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(-6.19, p < 0.05) and Number Acquired Squared (0.19, p < 0.05) are not significant predictors of
Revenue which according to Baron and Kenny (1986) is a necessary condition for mediation. However,
more recent research suggests that there are varying types and levels of mediation (Zhou, Lynch, &
Chen, 2010). Therefore, because Team Wins has a significant impact on Revenue and, in accordance
with Zhou and colleagues (2010), I conclude Team Wins partially mediates (i.e., indirect-only
mediation) Number Acquired and Revenue thus providing support for hypothesis 4a.
Next, for each additional win I find that Average Attendance increases by ~109 people. Although
the direct effects of Number Acquired (Number Acquired Squared) also do not significantly predict
Average Attendance, Number Acquired (Number Acquired Squared) significantly predict Team Wins,
and Team Wins significantly predict Average Attendance (109.13, p < 0.01) which provides indirectonly mediation and support for hypotheses 4b (Zhou et al, 2010).
For robustness, Made Playoffs was used as an alternative to Team Wins in the equations. The
results reinforce hypothesis 3b as Number Acquired (-0.17, p < 0.05) and Number Acquired Squared
(0.01, p < 0.05) have a similar impact on Made Playoffs as they did on Team Wins. Moreover, Made
Playoffs also has similar significant relationships as Team Wins when used as a mediating variable in the
Revenue equation. However, Made Playoffs did not significantly predict greater Average Attendance.
For further robustness the analyses were conducted for sub-samples of MLB. Baseball is broken
up into two leagues: The American League and the National League.10 The leagues are the same in most
ways except that the American League has a designated hitter rather than having the pitcher hit.
However, this does lead to more pinch hitting which in turn leads to more pitching changes in the
National League. It’s possible this difference influences team behaviors and strategies when developing
10

There are also three divisions within each league generally categorized by geographic location and
titled the West, Central, and East. However, because the division samples were relatively small (i.e., an
average of 50), results for divisions are not reported.
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or acquiring personnel. The National League also had 16 teams whereas the American League had 14
teams from 2002-2011. This makes it more difficult for National League teams to gain additional
revenues and attendance by making and playing more games during the playoffs. Hence the leagues
have some fundamental differences that may alter the effects and therefore I ran the analyses for each
league to see if the results varied by league. The results of the analyses for the two leagues show a few
notable differences. Developmental Ranking is significant for only the National League. The curvilinear
relationship as seen in Figure 3 is significant only for the American League and the impact Team Wins
has on Revenue is also significant only for the American League. Further considerations about these
league differences are provided in the discussion section.
Control Variables
Several control variables are significant predictors of Number Acquired in Study 1. Although the
results of Ownership Change, of which there were 18 in the sample, did not predict Number Acquired,
General Manager Change leads organizations to more of an acquisition based strategy (0.50, p < 0.10).
This may reflect a difference between owners, who may be more willing to pursue a long term strategy
of investing in the team’s developmental program, and general managers who adopt a win now strategy
perhaps to enhance their own job security.
In Study 2, a number of controls are also significant predictors. Developmental Ranking and
Acquisition Experience are significant predictors in the equation testing the alignment hypothesis while
Professional Experience, Annual Player Turnover, and Small-Market Size are significant predictors in
the equation testing the TMTG hypothesis demonstrating the importance of controlling for endogeneity
by including variables from Study 1. Number of All-Stars significantly impact Team Wins when testing
the alignment (0.20, p < 0.01) and TMGT hypotheses (2.97, p < 0.01). Several control variables also
impact financial outcomes in the mediating models (i.e., columns 4 and 6 in Table 10). When predicting
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Revenue, Professional Experience has a significant, negative impact (-3.08, p < 0.01). Yet Professional
Experience has a significant, positive impact on Team Wins and on Average Attendance (241.28, p <
0.01). This negative impact on Revenue could be due to higher labor costs as more experienced players
earn higher salaries. While Annual Player Turnover does not significantly affect Revenue, it negatively
impacts Average Attendance (-157.07, p < 0.05). Acquisition Experience positively impacts Average
Attendance (447.87, p < 0.01). Number of All-Stars positively impacts Average Attendance (258.81, p <
0.05), a finding most baseball fans might expect. Team Salary positively impacts both Revenue (1.10, p
< 0.01) and Average Attendance (90.31, p < 0.01). Perhaps this is due to fans’ desire to watch wellknown, high-paid athletes.11 Having a New Stadium positively impacts Revenue (21.04, p < 0.01) but not
Average Attendance. Finally, as fixed-effects models, 29 organization controls were included (i.e., the
New York Yankees organization was the excluded category) in the analyses for both studies. These
results can be examined in Appendix A through E.

11

The natural log of Team Salary also had positive and significant results on the outcomes. The natural
log transforms Team Salary to account for a wide variation among teams, eliminating undesirable
characteristics and providing a better measure of the relationship (Hair et al, 2010).
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Three fundamental gaps in the literature led to this research. First, concurrent sourcing has
received a great deal of attention in the past few years yet there still is a lack of clarity as to how, why,
and at what levels it is advantageous to organizations. Secondly, as much of the developed world has
moved toward knowledge and service economies, improving our understanding of human capital is
necessary, particularly in terms of how organizations source and how the decision impacts performance.
Third, as competitive advantage is fundamental to strategic management, working to more precisely
know how it impacts financial performance is important to academicians and organizational decision
makers. Hence, the purpose of this study is to answer three fundamental questions: What factors affect
organizations’ decisions to source their human capital? How do these decisions impact competitive
advantage? Does competitive advantage mediate the relationship between sourcing decisions and
financial outcomes?
This study advances research on the concurrent sourcing of human capital by applying various
theoretical perspectives to examine the causes and consequences of sourcing decisions within a labor
intensive industry. To empirically test these questions, regression and mediated regression using panel
data were used within the MLB setting. The results indicate that various organizational characteristics
impact human capital sourcing, that sourcing impacts competitive advantage, and competitive advantage
mediates the relationship between sourcing and financial outcomes. In conducting this research, I
contribute to the literature in the following areas as discussed below: TCE and organizational
capabilities; the TMGT effect and organization alignment; and competitive advantage. This discussion is
followed by implications for managerial practice, limitations and future research, and the conclusion.
This research assesses the usefulness of TCE when applied to sourcing human capital rather than
sourcing production, which is often the focus of TCE based research. Parmigiani (2007) found
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organizational capabilities to be a superior predictor of sourcing to TCE in small manufacturing firms.
Consistent with her findings, organizational capabilities also proved more useful as a predictor of
sourcing decisions for human capital in MLB. Although the TCE lens was not helpful in determining
human capital sourcing, talent uncertainty and frequency were useful TCE concepts in addressing
performance. On the other hand, the organizational capabilities reasoning proved very useful to
explaining sourcing decisions and in examining performance outcomes. Namely, an organization’s
developmental capabilities and experience play a critical role in both. In short, I find that in the context
of sourcing human capital in MLB, organizational capabilities provides superior explanatory power
relative to TCE.
Next, although I failed to find support for the importance of organizational alignment to
organizational performance, curvilinear effects of sourcing strategies on organizational outcomes appear
to be an important consideration for human capital scholars. According to the results (i.e., U shape),
rather than acquiring human capital based on organizations’ characteristics, or balancing their sourcing,
organizations are better off specializing in either greater internal or external sourcing. Organizations that
did not specialize, either in a make or a buy strategy, had lower organizational performance (see Figure
3 for a graphical representation). This graphical representation of the results is notable as one can clearly
see that varying levels of concurrent sourcing have varying impacts on performance. These results also
support my belief that concurrent sourcing should not be treated as a dichotomous phenomenon. The U
shape for this relationship indicates that organizations performed best when they used very little or
nearly all talent acquisitions rather than balancing. Perhaps specializing in developing human capital
(i.e., high make) builds team camaraderie and/or tacit knowledge among players. (Berman, Down, &
Hill, 2002). However, camaraderie doesn’t explain why a greater rather than marginal number of
strategic acquisitions also enhance performance. Thus if just marginally putting efforts toward one
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sourcing type did not appear helpful, organizations may need to make more of a commitment toward
one strategy or another in terms of sourcing human capital. There has been a great deal of recent
emphasis on this meta-theoretical principal (i.e., TMGT effect) and the results of this study provide
more evidence that scholars should continue to consider the likelihood that many relationships,
including the acquisition of human capital in sourcing decisions, are actually curvilinear.
Finally, this study contributed to the strategic management literature by utilizing a context which
provides a clear metric for competitive advantage, a very common concept in strategic management that
often proves difficult to capture empirically. This allowed me to demonstrate how human capital
sourcing decisions may impact competitive advantage and confirm that competitive advantage positively
impacts financial performance. The impact that competitive advantage has on financial outcomes further
establishes the importance of giving continued practical and scholarly attention to this concept. To the
extent that organizations can establish competitive advantage, their financial outcomes will be superior
to their competitors. As competitive advantage remains fundamental to strategic management, it is of
upmost importance that more studies empirically validate a difficult to operationalize construct.
There are also implications for managerial practice. Because specializing in vertical integration
or strategic acquisitions of human capital was most advantageous in terms of organizational outcomes,
organizations may want to focus heavily on training and development if they desire to pursue vertically
integrating talent. This might involve expanding the human resources department in terms of training,
development, recruiting, and so forth. On the other hand, training and development programs may
represent a loss of resources for partial commitment toward development and vertical integration of
employees, particularly because training can be a costly process if star apprentices are not recruited
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(Krautmann, Gustafson, & Hadley, 2000). Additionally, management may consider identifying how
their top employees were sourced to determine whether development or acquisition strategies have been
more effective.
Limitations and Future Research
Although the contributions of this research are useful to theory and practice, they are not without
some limitations. First, while the goal was to better explore talent uncertainty and frequency, choosing a
context with low asset specificity may be an inappropriate way to determine whether TCE or
organizational capabilities sheds more light on sourcing human capital. Some scholars argue that asset
specificity is essential to the fundamental ideas of TCE and that without asset specificity, TCE theory is
less applicable and useful (e.g., Whyte, 1994) and that asset specificity is a necessary condition to use
the transaction cost lens (David & Han, 2004). In the case of MLB, players develop nearly identical
skills regardless of the team they play for thus reducing asset specificity. However, teams have contract
rights of players for six years after players join the professional roster. In that regard, contracts add a
certain amount of asset specificity and incentivize teams to develop players more precisely for their
needs during this duration. Accordingly, contract rights provide some asset specificity hence
diminishing this limitation.
Secondly, sporting contexts are excellent when used for appropriate questions (Holcomb et al,
2009; Wolfe et al, 2005), but MLB still has a few limitations when trying to generalize to other contexts.
First, smaller-market teams are awarded subsidies from larger-market teams in order to level the playing
field. This is rarely seen in other industries and is in fact often reported in popular press as just the
opposite suggesting large corporations get better incentives in lieu of supporting small business. Thus,
this redistribution of funds is slightly less generalizable to organizational studies. Next, the extremely
low threat of entry in this context differs from that of most industries. While MLB may resemble
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oligopolies, oligopolies do not represent a majority of organizations. In addition, the context also
resembles industries that have, at one time or another, been highly regulated such as airlines, trucking,
and telecommunications. However, these industries too have become less regulated over time.
Ultimately, despite these limitations, MLB is actually a very good context to address these questions for
a number of reasons. MLB is unlike any of the other major sports in the United States, as it does not
employ a payroll cap. Because a payroll cap restricts the amount of money teams can spend on human
capital, selecting a sport without a payroll cap is most relevant to compare to other business
organizations. The lack of a payroll cap leads to a wide disparity in payrolls among the 30 teams in the
league and creates an interesting dynamic just as other business organizations greatly vary in size and
spending. Additionally, the player development structure in MLB is an aspect that is absent from other
sports in which players are drafted and immediately join the professional roster (e.g., NFL, NHL and
NBA). In this way, a baseball team’s developmental system is like those found in many organizations
where managerial talent is through the ranks of the organization (in comparison to arriving through other
organizations). Public accounting, law firms, and consulting firms act in a similar fashion often having
5-6 tiers in which employees typically move up or out after a certain duration. In sum, MLB is much
less (if at all) limiting in making generalizations to organizations for the questions in this study.
Regarding future directions for studying human capital sourcing, my hope is that this is a timely
study incorporating human capital with concurrent sourcing literature as scholars look to better
understand concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007) as well as find ways in which human capital leads to
competitive advantages (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). In addition to demonstrating ways in which human
capital enhances organizational performance, other future studies may come from this work. For
example, governance is often discussed as make, buy, or ally. While ally is not examined in the present
study, this context also has trading among organizations, an avenue that could further tap into concurrent
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sourcing and differences between trading for (i.e., relational, cooperation, or ally) and acquiring.
Researchers could also examine whether teams mimic sourcing ratios of other successful teams that
have similar characteristics. This may lead to interesting discoveries in institutional theory and
isomorphism regarding organizations’ strategic decisions and which characteristics organizations are
most likely to imitate. Another area of further study could look more closely at alignment. While
organizational alignment has proven relevant in other contexts (e.g., Sampson, 2004), it was
insignificant in this study. Perhaps scholarship would benefit from more studies pertaining to the
alignment of human capital to help determine how taking action based on organizational characteristics
may lead to competitive advantages, maybe utilizing other research methods, such as qualitative
methods, multilevel studies, or tests in other contexts. A further investigation of league and division
differences might provide a setting to better understand human capital sourcing differences among
various strategic groups or clusters within an industry because in this context (i.e., MLB teams compete
more often with intra-division rivals), as with many industries, organizations’ performance is not only
dependent on the industry but also largely dependent on the strength of their direct and closest
competitors within strategic groups (Rothaermel, 2013). Finally more broad considerations could be
studied determining why certain organizations divested and more specifically by looking at free agent
rankings within developmental capabilities.
At an individual level, ownership and general manager data in MLB is extremely interconnected
which could further studies on top management team turnover and networks within an industry (e.g.,
Hersch & Pelkowski, 2012). As seen with the control variables, this is an applicable context to study
owner and top management changes. Further studies could uncover whether owners change due to
performance, what characteristics cause general managers to migrate from team to team, the impact of
varying ownership types (e.g., syndicate or family), and so forth. Human resource scholars could also
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utilize this context for research in the recruiting literature as each MLB team has teams of recruiters and
scouts trying to identify talented personnel.
In conclusion, human capital and concurrent sourcing have received a great deal of attention in
the strategic management literature. This study helps integrate the two areas and provide useful
explanations as to how organizations source their talent and how these sourcing decisions drive
competitive advantage and then financial outcomes.
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APPENDIX A
ANTECEDENTS OF PLAYER ACQUISITION:
RESULTS FROM STUDY 1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:
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AnnualPlay~g
Developmen~g
Acquisitio~e
SmallMarke~e
OwnershipC~e
GeneralMan~e
Angels
Astros
Athletics
BlueJays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNatio~s
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
RedSox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
_cons

-.0513468
.0249912
.0482845
.3443991
-2.132099
-.5135978
.5039239
-3.094139
-1.318457
2.681008
-1.527017
-.944145
3.000865
1.119549
-1.040537
.5768595
1.368793
.2625544
.1673244
2.763854
2.04725
2.789522
.5476674
2.302959
3.257879
-.7535079
1.308763
1.293072
1.877344
1.229741
1.420696
(dropped)
1.244533
-.4271245
-.8229471
2.730706
10.26832

rhos =

Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(35)
Prob > chi2

30
30
36

Het-corrected
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

300
30
10
10
10
0.9097
303.33
0.0000

[95% Conf. Interval]

.0449293
.0434773
.014137
.0732396
1.701431
.3275394
.2731152
1.350397
1.215641
1.452552
1.067268
1.258514
1.539957
2.996036
2.983124
1.510827
1.432853
1.313363
1.285174
1.765489
1.617462
1.513617
1.312615
1.490697
1.64276
1.071194
1.807268
1.221266
1.541077
2.407786
1.208299

-1.14
0.57
3.42
4.70
-1.25
-1.57
1.85
-2.29
-1.08
1.85
-1.43
-0.75
1.95
0.37
-0.35
0.38
0.96
0.20
0.13
1.57
1.27
1.84
0.42
1.54
1.98
-0.70
0.72
1.06
1.22
0.51
1.18

0.253
0.565
0.001
0.000
0.210
0.117
0.065
0.022
0.278
0.065
0.152
0.453
0.051
0.709
0.727
0.703
0.339
0.842
0.896
0.117
0.206
0.065
0.677
0.122
0.047
0.482
0.469
0.290
0.223
0.610
0.240

-.1394067
-.0602228
.0205765
.2008521
-5.466843
-1.155563
-.031372
-5.740868
-3.701069
-.1659423
-3.618824
-3.410787
-.0173951
-4.752574
-6.887351
-2.384306
-1.439546
-2.311591
-2.351571
-.6964407
-1.122917
-.1771115
-2.025011
-.6187537
.0381291
-2.85301
-2.233417
-1.100564
-1.143112
-3.489434
-.9475262

.0367131
.1102052
.0759926
.487946
1.202645
.1283677
1.03922
-.4474095
1.064155
5.527959
.5647892
1.522497
6.019124
6.991673
4.806278
3.538025
4.177133
2.836699
2.68622
6.224148
5.217416
5.756156
3.120345
5.224671
6.477629
1.345995
4.850943
3.686709
4.8978
5.948916
3.788919

1.702553
1.402307
1.627399
1.036431
1.549967

0.73
-0.30
-0.51
2.63
6.62

0.465
0.761
0.613
0.008
0.000

-2.092411
-3.175596
-4.012591
.6993393
7.230439

4.581476
2.321347
2.366697
4.762073
13.3062

.6062463 -.0603922

-.128052 -.1504872
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.153926 ...

.390682

APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION ALIGNMENT OUTCOME:
RESULTS FROM STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:

id
Year
heteroskedastic (balanced)
panel-specific AR(1)

Estimated covariances
=
Estimated autocorrelations =
Estimated coefficients
=

TeamWins

Coef.

BuyasPredi~d
NumberofAl~s
TeamSalary
Profession~e
AnnualPlay~r
Developmen~g
Acquisitio~e
SmallMarke~e
Angels
Astros
Athletics
BlueJays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNatio~s
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
RedSox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
_cons

-.076305
2.90082
-.0328022
1.014015
-.5233373
-.054462
-.5326469
11.71069
2.91743
-3.970463
(dropped)
-2.024563
-.5406078
-19.4065
-13.18587
-6.787823
-16.64576
-1.476813
-8.450821
-2.992348
-15.66892
-20.2174
-13.31761
-7.103625
-21.7938
-14.40934
-1.495586
-24.23495
-2.285393
-16.28286
-19.25513
-2.749187
-17.59339
-25.71247
-9.268752
-12.4769
-1.746464
86.14074

rhos = -.1322145

Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(36)
Prob > chi2

30
30
37

Het-corrected
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

300
30
10
10
10
0.9151
590.32
0.0000

[95% Conf. Interval]

.921131
.3191344
.0240694
.1752621
.1848565
.0554951
.2374458
5.790866
3.997217
4.189688

-0.08
9.09
-1.36
5.79
-2.83
-0.98
-2.24
2.02
0.73
-0.95

0.934
0.000
0.173
0.000
0.005
0.326
0.025
0.043
0.465
0.343

-1.881689
2.275328
-.0799773
.670507
-.8856494
-.1632304
-.9980321
.3607996
-4.916971
-12.1821

1.729078
3.526312
.0143729
1.357522
-.1610252
.0543064
-.0672617
23.06058
10.75183
4.241174

4.266891
3.821575
5.133543
4.787948
3.376294
4.931184
3.284009
4.955979
4.434292
5.395006
4.922543
4.922502
3.713947
4.565994
4.885189
3.61938
4.690565
4.061438
5.703541
4.858004
3.07828
4.847996
4.901345
6.336837
5.073537
3.825555
7.046674

-0.47
-0.14
-3.78
-2.75
-2.01
-3.38
-0.45
-1.71
-0.67
-2.90
-4.11
-2.71
-1.91
-4.77
-2.95
-0.41
-5.17
-0.56
-2.85
-3.96
-0.89
-3.63
-5.25
-1.46
-2.46
-0.46
12.22

0.635
0.888
0.000
0.006
0.044
0.001
0.653
0.088
0.500
0.004
0.000
0.007
0.056
0.000
0.003
0.679
0.000
0.574
0.004
0.000
0.372
0.000
0.000
0.144
0.014
0.648
0.000

-10.38752
-8.030756
-29.46805
-22.57008
-13.40524
-26.3107
-7.913353
-18.16436
-11.6834
-26.24294
-29.86541
-22.96554
-14.38283
-30.74298
-23.98413
-8.58944
-33.42829
-10.24566
-27.46159
-28.77665
-8.782505
-27.09529
-35.31893
-21.68872
-22.42085
-9.244414
72.32951

6.33839
6.949541
-9.344936
-3.801665
-.1704089
-6.980813
4.959727
1.26272
5.698704
-5.094899
-10.5694
-3.669685
.1755775
-12.84462
-4.834545
5.598268
-15.04161
5.674878
-5.104123
-9.733622
3.28413
-8.091496
-16.10601
3.15122
-2.532951
5.751486
99.95196

-.134623

.4441166 -.0815815 -.0760462 ...

99

.0178586

APPENDIX C
TMGT EFFECT OUTCOME:
RESULTS FROM STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:

id
Year
heteroskedastic (balanced)
panel-specific AR(1)

Estimated covariances
=
Estimated autocorrelations =
Estimated coefficients
=

TeamWins

Coef.

NumberA~ired
NumberA~ared
NumberofAl~s
TeamSalary
Profession~e
AnnualPlay~r
Developmen~g
Acquisitio~e
SmallMarke~e
Angels
Astros
Athletics
BlueJays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNatio~s
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
RedSox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
_cons

-3.265106
.0918218
2.970544
-.0458154
1.046922
-.4790998
-.0412507
-.3918388
-13.67265
.2646272
-5.142645
24.24626
-2.867194
-1.815497
4.899392
11.0441
-7.240795
7.271408
-2.31354
-9.617024
-3.914006
8.830361
4.601405
11.05445
-7.921861
2.948846
9.393772
-1.944067
(dropped)
-2.920437
8.220256
4.6106
-3.760465
4.540031
-1.742188
-10.02942
10.09578
-2.793135
112.786

Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(37)
Prob > chi2

30
30
38

Het-corrected
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

300
30
10
10
10
0.9262
609.46
0.0000

[95% Conf. Interval]

1.258818
.038299
.3190512
.0242963
.1859987
.184928
.0547465
.2452818
4.809746
3.971012
4.088161
4.55082
4.242057
3.808575
3.626143
2.949568
3.391168
3.274194
3.30896
4.904014
4.57059
3.602058
3.215745
3.252332
3.713743
2.544094
3.172055
3.719071

-2.59
2.40
9.31
-1.89
5.63
-2.59
-0.75
-1.60
-2.84
0.07
-1.26
5.33
-0.68
-0.48
1.35
3.74
-2.14
2.22
-0.70
-1.96
-0.86
2.45
1.43
3.40
-2.13
1.16
2.96
-0.52

0.009
0.017
0.000
0.059
0.000
0.010
0.451
0.110
0.004
0.947
0.208
0.000
0.499
0.634
0.177
0.000
0.033
0.026
0.484
0.050
0.392
0.014
0.152
0.001
0.033
0.246
0.003
0.601

-5.732344
.0167572
2.345215
-.0934353
.6823713
-.841552
-.1485518
-.8725823
-23.09958
-7.518413
-13.15529
15.32682
-11.18147
-9.280167
-2.207719
5.263052
-13.88736
.8541054
-8.798982
-19.22871
-12.8722
1.770457
-1.70134
4.680001
-15.20066
-2.037488
3.176658
-9.233312

-.7978672
.1668864
3.595873
.0018045
1.411473
-.1166476
.0660504
.0889047
-4.245719
8.047667
2.870003
33.1657
5.447085
5.649173
12.0065
16.82515
-.5942282
13.68871
4.171902
-.0053325
5.044186
15.89027
10.90415
17.42891
-.6430577
7.935179
15.61088
5.345178

4.07663
4.187534
2.704132
3.077672
2.714901
3.06889
6.268408
2.787057
3.924818
12.33176

-0.72
1.96
1.71
-1.22
1.67
-0.57
-1.60
3.62
-0.71
9.15

0.474
0.050
0.088
0.222
0.094
0.570
0.110
0.000
0.477
0.000

-10.91049
.01284
-.6894002
-9.792591
-.781077
-7.757103
-22.31528
4.633249
-10.48564
88.61616

5.069611
16.42767
9.910601
2.27166
9.861139
4.272726
2.256432
15.55831
4.899367
136.9558

rhos = -.1813701 -.2664003

.3973649 -.1150778 -.1044858 ...

100

.0177524

APPENDIX D
REVENUE OUTCOME:
RESULTS FROM STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:

id
Year
heteroskedastic (balanced)
panel-specific AR(1)

Estimated covariances
=
Estimated autocorrelations =
Estimated coefficients
=

Revenue

Coef.

TeamWins
NumberA~ired
NumberA~ared
Profession~e
AnnualPlay~r
Developmen~g
Acquisitio~e
SmallMarke~e
NumberofAl~s
TeamSalary
NewStadium
Angels
Astros
Athletics
BlueJays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNatio~s
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
RedSox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
_cons

.4568989
-3.431643
.1021392
-3.074547
.4374902
-.0616246
-.4195695
-64.17071
1.347732
1.095005
21.04293
-80.2875
-55.89636
-13.85524
-79.36357
-63.72373
6.59832
9.749469
-37.1075
8.433449
-45.2241
-45.49786
-46.08575
18.85389
11.65965
4.138794
-49.29978
11.75821
17.56058
-70.0145
11.45625
-61.28125
5.94403
(dropped)
-42.19828
17.10113
3.497296
-70.73785
-21.52867
-66.72352
160.397

rhos =

.3497463

Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(39)
Prob > chi2

30
30
40

Het-corrected
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

300
30
10
10
10
0.8415
536.77
0.0000

[95% Conf. Interval]

.1457197
3.853885
.1211018
.565667
.5257448
.177711
.7416222
41.15054
1.037717
.0888939
7.213565
39.32547
41.14113
19.14508
42.56065
38.86301
14.75652
17.58728
39.44641
16.91639
43.73551
40.74796
39.82552
14.65891
15.81731
14.85525
39.35667
14.89641
15.80112
40.23577
15.742
43.00721
15.16806

3.14
-0.89
0.84
-5.44
0.83
-0.35
-0.57
-1.56
1.30
12.32
2.92
-2.04
-1.36
-0.72
-1.86
-1.64
0.45
0.55
-0.94
0.50
-1.03
-1.12
-1.16
1.29
0.74
0.28
-1.25
0.79
1.11
-1.74
0.73
-1.42
0.39

0.002
0.373
0.399
0.000
0.405
0.729
0.572
0.119
0.194
0.000
0.004
0.041
0.174
0.469
0.062
0.101
0.655
0.579
0.347
0.618
0.301
0.264
0.247
0.198
0.461
0.781
0.210
0.430
0.266
0.082
0.467
0.154
0.695

.1712936
-10.98512
-.135216
-4.183234
-.5929507
-.4099318
-1.873122
-144.8243
-.6861559
.9207763
6.904604
-157.364
-136.5315
-51.3789
-162.7809
-139.8938
-22.32394
-24.72096
-114.4211
-24.72206
-130.9441
-125.3624
-124.1423
-9.877055
-19.3417
-24.97695
-126.4374
-17.43822
-13.40904
-148.8752
-19.39751
-145.5738
-23.78483

.7425043
4.121833
.3394943
-1.96586
1.467931
.2866826
1.033983
16.48286
3.381619
1.269234
35.18126
-3.211001
24.73877
23.66842
4.053781
12.44638
35.52058
44.2199
40.20605
41.58896
40.49593
34.36667
31.97083
47.58483
42.66101
33.25454
27.83787
40.95465
48.53021
8.846153
42.31
23.01134
35.67289

40.23238
14.6184
15.72062
38.53813
18.02536
39.21789
51.90424

-1.05
1.17
0.22
-1.84
-1.19
-1.70
3.09

0.294
0.242
0.824
0.066
0.232
0.089
0.002

-121.0523
-11.55042
-27.31455
-146.2712
-56.85773
-143.5892
58.66653

36.65575
45.75267
34.30914
4.795497
13.8004
10.14213
262.1274

.758704

.5659591

.6040925
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.1852917 ... -.1557328

APPENDIX E
AVERAGE ATTENDANCE OUTCOME:
RESULTS FROM STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:

id
Year
heteroskedastic (balanced)
panel-specific AR(1)

Estimated covariances
=
Estimated autocorrelations =
Estimated coefficients
=

AverageAtt~e

Coef.

TeamWins
NumberA~ired
NumberA~ared
Profession~e
AnnualPlay~r
Developmen~g
Acquisitio~e
SmallMarke~e
NumberofAl~s
TeamSalary
NewStadium
Angels
Astros
Athletics
BlueJays
Braves
Brewers
Cardinals
Cubs
Diamondbacks
Dodgers
ExposNatio~s
Giants
Indians
Mariners
Marlins
Mets
Orioles
Padres
Phillies
Pirates
Rangers
Rays
Reds
RedSox
Rockies
Royals
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
_cons

109.1334
-652.1141
19.57016
241.2838
-157.0657
-10.77781
447.874
-1207.272
258.813
90.30851
1354.146
4539.938
588.5622
-4592.599
-6773.118
-3709.918
551.7707
3803.791
1639.1
-492.0489
6217.391
-8445.873
3534.196
-4687.028
-236.7087
-11035.97
-2253.022
-2281.243
-854.1412
-412.4397
-3747.059
-3027.162
-9283.26
-5658.028
-6832.338
1754.256
-6762.108
-4702.818
(dropped)
-9758.984
13819.84

rhos = -.0417998

Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(39)
Prob > chi2

30
30
40

Het-corrected
Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

300
30
10
10
10
0.9134
1707.23
0.0000

[95% Conf. Interval]

19.96735
553.3112
17.2108
82.75356
71.10744
23.95934
118.1753
4484.19
129.5778
13.48521
1151.713
2570.298
2868.775
4687.043
2915.434
2846.13
4269.395
3960.53
2364.281
3800.069
2644.476
3855.912
2377.283
3919.378
4296.52
4062.543
4271.723
4432.945
3975.641
3065.757
3817.425
2625.782
3932.784
4013.418
2208.195
3976.858
3884.242
2582.17

5.47
-1.18
1.14
2.92
-2.21
-0.45
3.79
-0.27
2.00
6.70
1.18
1.77
0.21
-0.98
-2.32
-1.30
0.13
0.96
0.69
-0.13
2.35
-2.19
1.49
-1.20
-0.06
-2.72
-0.53
-0.51
-0.21
-0.13
-0.98
-1.15
-2.36
-1.41
-3.09
0.44
-1.74
-1.82

0.000
0.239
0.256
0.004
0.027
0.653
0.000
0.788
0.046
0.000
0.240
0.077
0.837
0.327
0.020
0.192
0.897
0.337
0.488
0.897
0.019
0.028
0.137
0.232
0.956
0.007
0.598
0.607
0.830
0.893
0.326
0.249
0.018
0.159
0.002
0.659
0.082
0.069

69.99814
-1736.584
-14.16239
79.08979
-296.4337
-57.73725
216.2547
-9996.123
4.845163
63.87798
-903.169
-497.7532
-5034.134
-13779.03
-12487.26
-9288.231
-7816.09
-3958.706
-2994.805
-7940.047
1034.314
-16003.32
-1125.193
-12368.87
-8657.733
-18998.41
-10625.44
-10969.66
-8646.254
-6421.212
-11229.08
-8173.6
-16991.38
-13524.18
-11160.32
-6040.242
-14375.08
-9763.779

148.2687
432.3559
53.30271
403.4778
-17.69766
36.18164
679.4934
7581.579
512.7809
116.739
3611.461
9577.629
6211.259
4593.837
-1058.972
1868.395
8919.631
11566.29
6273.006
6955.95
11400.47
-888.4237
8193.584
2994.811
8184.315
-3073.536
6119.401
6407.169
6937.971
5596.333
3734.958
2119.276
-1575.145
2208.127
-2504.355
9548.754
850.8658
358.1431

3923.11
6074.162

-2.49
2.28

0.013
0.023

-17448.14
1914.697

-2069.829
25724.97

.4220957

.8090793

.6098928
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.6002124 ...

.6039615
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